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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to  provide an  overview and  discussion of  critical
economic  approaches to the  modelling of fertility levels. By an economic approach to
fertility modelling we mean any approach that explains fertility outcomes (specifically,
birth variables) as the result of economic  decision-making  (the deliberate weighing  of
costs and benefits), among other  things. These would be  distinguished from  purely
noneconomic  approaches to fertility,  in which fertility levels are fundamentally  explained
by noneconomic  factors (e.g., biological  or  cultural factors.) This criterion also excludes
approaches  which  include economic  factors as part of an explanation  of fertility, but not in
any  (ezplicit  or  implicit)  choice-theoretic  fashion.  Hence, a  model  in  which  lifetime
fertility is a function  of only uncontroUlable  socio-economic  variables does not fail within
the  scope of  this paper. This categorization also exludes  from our  discussion pure
time-series models where current fertility is modelled  largely as a function of past fertility
and uncontrollable  economic  indicators such as the woman's wage, husband's  income, age,
urbanization.  These approaches provide much useful descriptive information about the
fertility process and its  response to changes in socioeconomic  levels but  again omit
behavioral  considerations  underlying  the active  decision  to regulate fertility.  The exclusion
of these models  from our review,  however,  is without  prejudice;  it should by no means be
construed  as a reflection on their research value. Many  of the models we do review below
are based in part or guided by analysis  based on noneconomic  or nonbehavioral  models.  It
is largely a consequence  of a need to narrow down the scope of this paper to manageable
levels  that we have chosen to focus  only on behavioral  economic  models  of fertility.
Despite this narrow categorization  there are still numerous papers which are based
on choice-theoretic  economic  models.  Eidsting  papers, however,  can be usefully  classified
into one of two categories:  static lifetime fertility  models and dynamic models of fertlity.
Under the heading of static lifetime fertility models, we consider as  prototypical for
purposes  of review three models:  the framework  of Easterlin-Crimmins  (1983),  which was
the  organizing paradigm for  the  National  Academy of  Sciences study  of  fertility
determinants in  less-developed  countries  (3ulatao  and  Lee,  eds.,1983); the  rival
microeconomic  model of Rosenzweig  and Schultz (1985) and (1987); and the important
2reformulation  of the Easterlin-Crimmins  framework  carried out by Montgomery  (1987).
The growing  class of dynamic  stochastic  fertility  models are represented  in this review by
the recent work of Wolpin (1984), Newman  (1988), and the macromodel  of Barro and
Becker (1989).
Each section  in this review consists  of (i) a summary  of the theoretical model under
discussion,  (ii) accompanying  comments regarding the  elements of the  theory, (iii) a
discussion  of the how each model has been implemented  empirically  and, usually, (iv) an
evaluation  of the strong and weak  points  of the approach.  The discussions  are interspersed
with technical representations where it  was deemed convenient for reference to the
original  source,  or necessary  to bring  out a point. Effort was  made to keep technicalities  to
a minimum, however as formalisms  are  the core of  any formal model it is generally
indispensable to understand them in order to arrive at an informed assessment of  a
model's  strengths  and limitations.
Because  some of these economic  models  of fertility  were developed  out of dissimilar
intellectual  traditions and for diverse  purposes, it is '.fir to forewarn the reader that this
review is written from the vantage point of one who subscribes  to the basic modelling
framework  of neoclassical  economics,  which would hold that fertility outcomes may be
usefully modelled as  the  end  result of  constrained uWility-maximizing  decisions of
households.  We acknowledge,  however,  that regardless  of one's basic operating  paradigm,
the scientific  validity  of the approach rests fundamentally  on two criteria: first, that the
assumptions  of the theory be internally  consistent,  and secondly,  however unrealistic  the
assumptions  may be, the testable implications  of the theory should not be rejected by
real-world data drawn from a broad range of contexts  and sources.  As far as the realism
of the assumptions  made in the models  here, our pragmatic  view is that this is useful only
to the extent that 'Eealistic"  assumptions  are more likely to lead to testable implications
that are  difficult to  reject with real-world evidence. It  is hoped that this Popperian
viewpoint  does not render the ideas herein useless to the general consumer  of fertlity
research. Nonetheless,  should the difference  in philosophies  be too wide the reader is
fortunate to have several guod alternative reviews  available  (see Schultz,  1986;  Easterlin,
1986;  Cochrane, 1987)  and is also invited to consider the original  sources and draw her
own conclusions.
We shall  evaluate the models  according  to the chronology  of their appearance in the
literature, beginning  with  that of Easterlin  and "rimmins,  1985  (henceforth,  called EC.)
3Static Modeb
1. Easterlin  and Crimmins  (EC).
1.1.  Concepts.
In  their  1985 book, The  Fertility Revolution, R.  Easterlin and  E.  Crimmins
introduced a  'tupply-demand" model into  the  fertility determinants literature  which
hitherto had ignored or  underplayed the  influence of  economizing  behavior in  the
determination of  levels of  fertility and  birth  control. EC  developed this  model by
extending  the older proximate  determinants  approach  to include economic  determinants  of
deliberate fertility control. The proximate  determinants  approach  to fertility ( Davis and
Blake, 1956) was an  essentially biological theory that  posited two basic structural
relationships  behind fertility outcomes.  First, it was held that there exists a direct causal
relationship  from a set of biological  states of an individual  to her lifetime fertility level.
Th se biological  states are referred to as the  '"roximate determinants"  of fertility and
represent  a convenient  summary  of the characteristics  of the individual  that are relevant to
her expected  reproductive  capacity.  Secondly  ( and this is the most important component
of  the  approach from a  behavioral science standpoint) the  proximate determinants
approach says that socioeconomic  conditions  and behavior can influence fertility levels
through  altering  the proximate  determinants  of individual  fertility.
One important contribution  of EC was to reemphasize  the role of the second set of
structural relationships,  which had become increasingly  neglected (though perhaps not
unfairly so) in favor of biological proximate determinants. This was accomplished by
extending  the proximate determinants framework  to include behavioral factors derived
from the  economics  traditdon. EC identified three determinants of deliberate fertlity
control:  (1) the 'bupply"  of children,  defined as "the number  of surviving  children  a couple
would have in  the  absece  of  deliberate frt  reguktion'  (this  is also  referred  to  as the
'>otential supply"  of children; (2) the '"emand" for children, defined as  "the number of
surviving children  parents would want if fertiiy  regulation  were costlss;" and (3) the
'bosts"'  of fertility  regulation,  which  are defined as the psychic  costs associated  uith learning
about and using specific fertility regulation  techniques.  We examine these concepts in
reverse  order.
41.1.1.  Regulation  Costs.
With respect  to regulation  costs,  Easterlin and Crimmins  remark that
These costs,  in turn, depend upon (a) the attittudes  in society  toward the general
notion or fertility control and toward specific techniques,  and (b)  the  degree of
access  to fertility control in terms of both the availability  of information and the
range of specific  techniques,  and their prices.  ( The Fertility Revolution,  p.18.  Italics
mine)
Later EC take the ideal measure of regulation costs to be  "'data that  reflect a
household's  subjective  attitudes  toward the use of fertility  control,  their information  about
methods of control, and the economic costs of obtaining additional knowledge  about
techniques of  control and purchasing supplies or  services needed for control." (  The
Fertility Revolution, p.51.)  With these various dimensions entering the  definition of
regulation  costs  it is clear that EC do not measure regulation  costs  in the usual sense of a
(possibly  imputed)  monetary measure of required information-gathering  activity,  psychic
discomfort  from regulation, and market costs of regulation.  It is a more complex  index
they have  in mind  even if it is often more convenient  to interpret it as a monetary  index
1.1.2.  Demand  for Children.
Critical  to an understanding  of the EC framework  is an appreciation  of their special
concepts  of demand and supply  for children,  and how these are different from the usual
economic  meaning  of the terms demand  and supply.  These terms demand for fertility  and
supply  of fertility  are ubiquitous  in the research  stemming  from the EC framework  and in
the other economic  approaches  to fertility.  From the perspective  of building  an economic
theory of fertility the concepts of demand and supply are clearly important as  these
summarize  the outcome of choice for changes  in the relative benefits and the costs of
fertility.  Unfortunately  the terms demand and supply  do not mean the same thing across
models, and this nonuniform usage has created an unwarranted  amount of confusion  in
the literature.
In  the EC framework the demand for children is a  consequence  of  household
maximizing  behavior under the hypothetical  situation where monetary and nonmonetary
costs of regulation  are zero (this seems to be what they had in mind  in their discussion  of
demand on p.15  of their book.) There is some kind of partial maximizing  behavior on the
5part of individuals built into their concept of  demand, but it is not fully maximizing
behavior because EC  'Uemand"  is not defined for  regulation costs that are  nonzero.
Hence,  the  price  of  regulation has  no  theoretical bearing  on  the  'demand"  of
utility-maxdmizing  individuals  for children.  Contrast  this with the meaning of demand in a
standard economic cho. a  model where, for individuals to  be  fully maximized, they
determine  their levels of demand for all possible  price configurations.
One can criticize  the EC model on the grounds  that it is very difficult  to make sense
of the implicit  assumption  that individuals  are taken to maximize  over only a very small
part of the set of price cordigurations  in the economy  (in the parlance  of statistics,  it would
be a set of 'Ieasure  zero".)  Granted that one might  muster some survey  evidence to show
that lifetime  family  size preferences  for children are formed independently  of regulation
costsi, such evidence does not imply that a maximizing  individual demand for children
does not vary with regulation costs ( e.g., direct utility functions do not take prices as
arguments,  but demand functions  do.) Additionally,  it was  completely  unnecessary  to work
with this demand concept, as it is easy enough to define a tractable fertility demand
concept which includes regulation costs, as  the  Montgomery model below does. If
anything,  in using  the EC demand concept one loses a potential way of checling for the
consistency  of empirical results against preconceptions  the survey  data supplies one with.
If one were to estimate a standard demand  equation which includes  regulation costs as a
right-hand side variable, it would possible to test if the lifetime demand for children is
highly inelastic  with respect to regulation  cost. We cannot carry out this kind of a test
using  the EC demand  concept because  the dependence  on regulation  costs is only defined
for the zero level-any  data used to estimate the EC demand function  would have to be
selected only  for zero regulation  cost  level, and could not provide  a test for the size of the
response in demand to changes  in regulation costs.  It would appear that the EC demand
concept was defined as it was in order to take advantage of existing survey data on
lifetime  family  size preferences,  and not really to provide  a 'aithful" representation  of the
economic  concept  of demand  in the context  of the proximate  determinants  approach.
Since it is difficult to  motivate the  type of  partial maimization  of  individuals
implicit in the EC  framework, does this require one to  abandon the  assumption of
manxmizing  individuals altogether? Not necessarily;  correspondence with an economic
construct  does not of itself make a concept  useful nor does noncorrespondence  render it
useless.  Conceivably,  one might still take the EC demand concept at face value for now,
proceeding  on the interpretation that either individuals  are non-maxdmizers,  or that they
are maximizers  but their underlying  preferences  are such that their ultimate demand for
6children is inelastic with respect to the cost of regulation.  The second problem with the
EC demand concept is that it is not observable from actual outcomes but  must be
obtained from direct responses to ideal family size questions. Admittedly,  there still is
considerable  bias in the economics  profession  against dte use of answers to hypoth.tical
questions,  though economists,  on occasion,  have relied on survey information and on
answers of individuals  to retrospective  or hypothetical questions. 2 As far as  using such
responses to measure the EC "damand"  for children, it is admissible  for as long as in
asking the question  about ideal lifetime demand for children the analyst (i) controls for
regulation  costs being zero, (ii) controls for the levels of other variables like the social
environment, husband's income, etc., remaining at  some fixed lIvels  (e.g., historical
levels),  and (iii) there is no problem  of truthful preference  revelation  in the survey  design.
As critics  of the EC mcdel have since pointed out (correctly),  responses  to the question 'If
you could choose exactly  the number of children to have in your whole life, how many
would that be?" will not be reliable measures of the  demand for children. From the
phrasing of the question it  is unclear to  the  respondent that she is  to assume that
regulation costs are zero and other variables are taken as fixed (possibly  at  historical
levels) when she answers this question. Hence, (i) and (ii) are definitely  violated. 3 In
addition, whether this particular survey question elicits truthful responses may also be
challenged.
1.1.3. SuDDly  of Children.
Considering  now the notion of the supply  of children  it is noteworthy,  as the authors
themselves  recognize  (The Fertilitv Revoluaion.  p.50), that EC 'Supply"  is unobservabk  as
well. Moreover,  like the EC demand concept,  the 'bupply"  of children  is not regarded as a
function  of the regulation  costs of fertility.  These are the two problems  associated  with the
EC supply concept; the  latter  is  mainly a  conceptual issue and  poses problems of
interpretation  similar to those created  by the EC demand  concept.  The nonobservability  of
supply,  however,  poses problems that are of a more practical nature. Because it is not
directly  observable  it must be defined  implicitly  in terms of some function  of observables.
This is where  EC appeal to the proximate  determinants  hypothesis  to suggest  that 'bupply"
may be proxied  for by a linear function  of observable  proximate  determinants,  such as the
duration of marriage, birth intervals,  breastfeeding,  etc. Already  this begs the question  of
how completely  an individual's  'bupply"  of children  is characterized  by the choice  of these
proximate  determinants.  This issue aside, though, we will show, momentarily,  how the
supply  measure  can be calculated  econometrically  and, as will  then become  apparent, the
7estimability  of the EC fertility  equa ion turns out to depend even more crucially  upon the
direct observability  of "'demand."  This makes the assumed observability  of the "demand"
for children  even  more critical  for the implementation  of this framework.
To provide some perspective,  we summarize  at this point the overall theoretical
structure of the EC framework  in the form of a "path"
As e-ddent  in the direction  of the arrows (indicating  causation),  the EC framework  is
a one-way system without any feedback loops that may denote simultaneity effects or
lagged effects. lhe  basic EC model is properly regarded as a static model of  lifetime
choice.  This is an important  and distinguishing  feature of the EC framework,  which  results
from the way the demand, supply, and regulation costs have been defined, and which
allows  for identification  of a statistical  forrm  of the model. 4
1.2.  Econometric  ImDlementation.
1.2.1.  ModeL.
Formally,  the EC model consists of a three-equation system (in their book EC
implement only the first two equations in the  system.) To  capture the  causal links
described  by the arrows  labelled "A"  there is the proximate-determinants  equation:
(1.1)  S =  ,O  +  alxl  +  a**  +  *+  ax  +  8z + e
where  S = children  ever born
z =  use oi contraception, in units of time since first use
xll2,.,-,=  seven proximate determinants, namely, duration of marriage
in years,  first birth interval in months,  second birth interval  in
months, not secondarily  sterile, months of breastfeeding  in
last closed  interval, proportion of pregnancy  wastage,  and x7,
the proportion  of child  mortality.
8e = a random  disturbance  term
To capture  the causal relationships  labelled 'rB"  in Fig.1,  EC posit the we-equation:
(1.2)  Z- C 00+  0l1(Sn-Sd)  +  2RC + 
where  z* = z defined in (1.1) if z > 0, = 0 otherwise
S  = (1-x7).N, with ii =  ao + a 1 x  +  "x  +  *+  a7x7 ineq.(1.1)
= '%upply  of children"
Sd  = "demand"  for children
RC = regulation costs
v  =  a stochastic disturbance term
Finally,  to model the causal link labelled 'C" there is posited  what may  they refer to as the
'iodernization equation"
rx1
(1.3)  jSd]  +y+r' 1 m+r2*c+C
lRC
where  X= (x 1,x2,...,x 7), the vector  of proidmate  determinants  above
m = a vector  of variables  measuring  the degree  of modernization
c =  a vector of other variables  (particularly  cultural variables)
C  = a stochastic  disturbance  vector
r1X2  = parameter matrices  to be estimated
In their subsequent (1985) empirical study EC disregard the last equation (1.3)
9because data for m and c were not extensive  and because  available  data according to EC
allowed  for a direct estimation  of (1.1) and (1.2) without  requiring  a recursion on (1.3) as
well. In a later study (Easterlin, Crimmins,  and Osheba, 'The Determinants of Fertility
Control," in  Hallouda,  Farid,  and  Cochrane,  eds.,  Demographic Resnonses  to
Modernization.)  (1.3) is estimated together with (1.1) and (1.2). The original procedure
adopted  in The Fertility Revolution  can be summarized  succinctly  as follows:
I.  Because  z appears in (1.1) and z is also function  of v ( the error term in (1.2)),
if the disturbances  e and v are correlated  direct OLS (Ordinary Least-Squares
estimation)  on eq.(1.1)  will not give unbiased  or consistent  estimates of the a's
(i.e., a consistent  estimator  for a is one that is arbitrarily  close  in probability  to
the true a in large samples.)  To carry  out OLS  on (1.1) requires substituting  z
with an instrumental  variable for z ( i.e., a variable which  is correlated with z
but uncorrelated  with v.) Such  an instrument  is given by the expected  value of
z, E(z), calculated  from the reduced form of (1.2):
(1.2')  Z* =  an +  lxl  + *-- +  67x7 +  68Sd  + 69RC + v
Note that the appearance of Sd in this reduced  form is a consequence  of how
Sd was defined-it  is  assumed to  be  exogenous (and not  simultaneously
determined) in  the EC framework. Note also that the notation of  EC is
unfortunately  imprecise  because  the subvector  of parameters (61'***'d7)  can be
shoiwn  to be equal to #1(1-x7)H(a 1,...,ci 7) and is therefore a function  of x7, the
proportion  of child mortality.  This sort of imprecision  can do potential harm to
policy  inference that is based on reduced forms only like (1.2'). The first step
then, is to estimate (1.2') by the Tobit procedure.5  This allows  us to calculate
E(z) for each individual  in the sample  according  to
E(z) = t.(6o+6 1x1 + ..  +67x?+68Sd+69RC)  + oO
where a is the Tobit standard  error and .0  and 0 are the standard normal c.df.
and p.d.f. evaluated at the level  * 1.(  o +  61x1 +  *--  +  67x7 +  685d +
69RC ) (hatted parameters  are the Tobit  estimates.)
10II.  For each individua!  observation,  replace z by E(z) and run OLS on (1.1). This
gives  consistent  estimates  of the a's.
III.  Construct  values of Sn =  (1-x7).N using estimates of the a's  from step II.
Use these constructed  values  in eq.(1.2)  and estimate that equation by OLS.
1.2.2.  Critigue  of the Empirical EC Model.
The abovb estimation  strategy  is, in fact, the appropriate  one for implementing  the
model as EC had outlined it, with its special interpretation of '"emand," '2upply,"  and
regulation costs, and  with its  assumptions about the  stochastic independence of  the
disturbances  in (1.1)-(1.3). Therefore, as Easterlin (1986) sought to make clear in his
repinder to Schultz's  (1986)  critique, the question  of appropriate estimation  methodology
is not the real issue.
Schultz (1986) criticized the estimation strategy for the  proximate determinants
equation on the grounds that simple OLS on eq.(1.1)  gives  inconsistent  estimates of the
true slope coefficients.  This, he argues, is because the explanatory  variables of  (1.1),
especially  any variable that represents  or proxies  for contraceptive  usage,  will generally  be
correlated with the equation error e. This correlation is attributed directly to economic
choices in the presence of unobservable  variations in individual  fecundity or  'hatural"
fertility  levels.
Imagine  that individuals  have different  levels  of fecundity.  Schultz,  whose  alternative
model we will shortly examine, argues that  because differences in fecundity are not
directly  observable  to the researcher  they will be lumped into the error term e of eq.(1.1).
Now even if individuals  do not know  initially  what their true fecundity  is, if they observe
that over time they have higher than average  births, *hey  will tend over time to self-select
into more rigorous  contraceptive  regimes.  This will  mean that such a fecundity  component
of e will  be statistically  correlated with  the equation error of (1.2) above, and will thus be
correlated with contraceptive use z. Since contraceptive  use z is also an explanatory
variable in (1.1) for actual births,  we have a case where a regressor,  z, is correlated with
the equation error, and in such situations  straight OLS gives  inconsistent  estimates of the
parameters  in (1.1).  This led Schultz  to different  empirical  model  (see Section  2 below.)
In defence of EC, their original methodology  was not OLS but an instrumental-
variables procedure chosen  precisely  to treat this potential  probkm of correlation  between
contraceptive  use and the fertility equation  error,  which  they were quite aware  of:
11In  our  exploratory WFS  [World  Fertility  Survey] study, which  emphasized
simple  techniques,  we estimated (la)  [ the fertility  equation (1.1) above) by ordinary
least squares. An objection to this is that the simultaneous  nature of  the model
suggests  that the use variable and the disturbance term in (la)  are likely to be
correlated. As we shall see in the next chapter, there is evidence to this effect.
Hence the present two-stage procedure was adopted in which an instrumental use
variable was  constructed  ...  and employed  instead of the observed  values of use to
estimate (la). ( The Fertility  Revolution,  p.41.)
So that part of  the  Schultz critique which focuses on  untreated correlation of
contraceptive  use with the proximate determinants equation error is amiss. However,
Schultz did point out the possibility  that the other explanatory  variables in x besides
contraceptive  use are correlated with the equation error. Schultz also remarks that the
static nature of the EC model leaves much to be desired in the treatment of dynamic
influences  on contraceptive  use, which in the EC model are captured very indirectly via
adjustments of stock variables ( like expected lifetime excess supply  of children.) The
possibilities  of 'Ion-orthogonality"  of the explanatory variables  with the equation error
should certainly be taken into account in estimation if the researcher has evidence or
strong  priors that these correlations  are likely  to be significant.  However  this criticism  can
at some level be regarded as a disagreement  over the fundamental  model that specifies
what variables  are endogenous  (determined  by other variables  in the model) and what can
be  treated  as  exDgenous (determined from  outside  the  model), rather  than  any
fundamental disagreement  over the strategy of estimation. Easterlin was thus probably
correct to  regard the  point of  departure  for  Schultz's critique as  stemming from
disagreement  about what the "correct"  theoretical  model to implement  is (or should be.) If
one were to look closely  at the EC model with its idiosyncracies,  the estimation  procedure
adopted  for  that  model  is  appropriate.  Whether  the  EC  model  serously  misspecifies
certain explanatory  variables  as being exogenous,  and therefore statistically  uncorrelated
with the corresponding  equation error is, at bottom, an empirically  testable question that
requires  one  to  look  at  the  data  and  think about  what one  considers a  "'erious
misspecification.' 0 Neither side in this debate, however, report formal tests of the EC
model that would  confirm  or deny the existence  of such remaining  correlation,  or provide
measures  for the probable size of parameter inconsistencies  due to this omission.
There are still other sources  of potential misspecification  problems  arising froui the
assumption that the  EC  demand for  children is  exDgenous  or  even just statistically
12uncorrelated with the error of the reduced-form  equation (1.2'). If the lifetime demand
for children can,  in fact, be measured  by asking  survey  respondents  a direct question, then
perhaps it is legitimate to treat their answers as exogenous  data for  Sd in  (1.2'). If,
however,  we believe that all the only data that one can observe  with any reliability  is the
equilibrium  outcome of the interaction between supply  forces and demand for children,
then it would  not be legitimate  to use Sd as an explanatory  variable in the reduced form,
as the Sd is determined  jointly  with  supply  Sn (and happens to equal Sn plus an error that
reflects imperfect fertility control-refer  back to the definitions  of supply and demand
given  at the start of Section  1.) It becomes  necessary,  then, to solve  a simultaneous  model.
This fact, together  with some other weaknesses  rientioned above,  led Montgomery  (1987)
to reformulate  the EC framework  around this potential  problem.  But even if we assume  in
our model that demand  is, theoretically,  an exogenous  variable,  it is possible  in fact for the
actual demand  data have considerable  statistical  correlation  with the error term v of (1.2'),
possibly  because  there are omitted explanatory  variables  that jointly  influence the demand
for children and the reduced-form error v. For example, '!modernization"  may lead to
greater economic  benefits  to women's  labor force participation  and will thus constitute a
negative  shock  to the lifetime  demand for children.  But it may also lead to shocks  to the
level of contraceptive  usage in a way  not captured by any of the explanatory  variables  x;
Sol or RC, by say, changing  cultural patterns to make contraceptive  use at earlier ages
more  (or  less) socially acceutable, or  by increasing (or  decreasing) average coital
frequency,  or by increasing (or  decreasing)  the overall length of stable unions in the
society-  anything  that might possibly  shift the intercept parameter 6o  of the reduced  form
(1.2') in a systematic  way.  If this is the case, then it is necessary  to work with the larger
model that includes  something  like equation (1.3),  requiring more in the way  of analysis
and data.
1.3.  An Evaluation.
Despite the amount of criticism  that has been directed against the EC framework  it
has been pointed out (Montgomery,  1987) that it is a useful and versatile model for
organizing  one's thinking about the factors affecting  fertility and contraceptive use. Its
linear design  is simple and readily  extended  and the unambiguous  direction  of the implied
causations  simplify  somewhat  the estimation  procedure  (which,  unfortunately,  is needlessly
complicated by the  EC  concepts of  demand and  supply.) Additionally, once  one
understands  the EC meaning  of demand,  supply,  and regulation  costs  interpretation of the
13results are straightforward.  Historically  the EC framework's  significance  lies in reorienting
the analytical  focus  of demographic  research in fertility back towards behavioral issues,
and with emphasis  on the effect of economic  factors not Just on the demand side but on
the supply  side as well. Perhaps  its biggest  current advantage  lies in how easily it fits as an
analytical  tool for the study of KAP-type (knowledge-attitudes-pra^tice)  data sets, and
there are many  of these available.  Its biggest  practical  drawbacks  are its static formulation
and  its  ad  hoc  behavioral specification which leaves it  open  to  many potential
misspecification  problems. Some of  these misspecification  problems can contribute to
difficulties  in the use of the model for policy  simulation,  but we reserve this for a separate
paper on the policy implications of methodological  assumptions.  The weakest points,
conceptually,  are the  EC concepts of  '"emand" and 'tupply," which are awkward  and
somewhat misleading.  In  what follows we dispense with their interpretation of  these
concepts altogether in favor of the standard economic interpretation of demand and
supply (which are  defined over the  full range of  costs and prices.) In  doing so, we
recognize  that by itself this does not invalidate  the basic approach  of EC, but inasmuch  as
the way EC define demand and supply  is not as informative  as an economist's  standard
definition  of demand  and supply,  we  hope to lay this terminology  to rest.
2. RosenzweiLand  Schultz  (RS).
2.1. Introduction and-Concet.
An important  challenge to the EC paradigm  above was raised in the model of M.
Rosenzweig  and T.P. Schultz  ('The Demand  for and Supply  of Births:  Fertility and its Life
Cycle Consequences,"  American Economic  Review, 1985),  with extensions  in other work
by  the  two  authors  ("Fertility and  Investments in  Human  Capital," Journal  of
Econometrics, 1985  and  'Schooling, Information,  and  Nonmarket  Productivity:
Contraceptive  Use and its  Effectiveness,"  International Economic Review, 1989.) The
model, in its theoretical structure, is an application of the maximization  paradigm in
economics to  fertility and  female labor force participation decisions, extending the
tradition of the models of household behavior of Becker (1973, 1981). The theoretical
model is an opimization problem carried out by individuals subject to, but not fully
restricted,  by constraints,  economic  and biological.  Hence its main behavioral  presumption
is that individuals  have control over some (not necessarily all) aspects of  their own
fertility, and make decisions about things lile  contraceptive use and family size to
maximize  something,  in this case, their welfare as measured by a lifetime utility function
14or utility  index.
There are those who are uncomfortable with the paradigm of a  mathematical
representation  of preferences.  The basic  idea is, however,  that if preferences  over pairwise
comparisons of  consumption bundles  obey  some  intuitively plausible  properties
(completeness,  continuity,  monotonicity,  convexity)  such a mathematical  representation  of
preferences  is guaranteed  to exist.  The characteristics  of the utility  function  (its form and
its parameters) offer a  convenient  way of describing  and summarizing  what individual
preferences  are without really saying how they came to be that way.  In this sense the
analyst  is able to mentally  separate the way 'conecious"  choice  behavior  operates from the
way behavior itself might be 'unconsciously"  or subconsciously  shaped-the  "conscious"
part of choice behavior is what occurs when individuals  make decisions  given a utility
function,  'Subconscious"  behavior  is part of what makes up the black  box called the 4lity
function. The standard response to  the  criticism that  economic analysis regards all
behe2ior  as a matter of conscious  choice  is that the construct  of the utility  function  can be
exdended  to include forces, conscious  or unconscious,  that are imagined  to impinge upon
the parameters  of individual  preferences. 7 , 8 If the problem is that individuals  may not be
exclusively  individualistic,  the utility concept can be extended, if necessary,  to include
certain forms of altruistic behavior (e.g., bequest motives) without really changing  the
fundamental  structure of the choice situation.  This idea is pursued, for example,  in the
model  of Barro and Becker (1988,  1989)  which  is reviewed  later.
2.2.  Rosenzweig  and Schultz  (1985).
2.2.1.  Theoretical  Soecification.
The Rosenzweig-Schultz  (1985) theoretical model (RS, hereafter) is  a  dynamic
programming  model of individual  choice  in an environment  where there are certain kinds
of randomness.  Hence it shares many features in common with an earlier theoretical
model  of Wolpin  (1984),  which  also models  fertility choice  in a dynamic  situation.  (In the
empirical implementation of  their  model  RS  are  able  to  simplify much  of  the
econometrics  at the cost of sacrificing  aU  the interesting dynamic  properties  of the original
theoretical  model. By contrast,  Wolpin's study allows  one to address essentially  dynamic
questions  such as birth spacing,  birth timing,  and intertemporal  tradeoffs  at the cost of a
significantly  more complex  estimation  procedure.  We discuss  Wolpin's  and related work  in
the section  on dynamic  stochastic  models  of ferdlity.)  It is helpful,  initially,  to think of the
15individual in  the  RS  model as  a  '1epresentative agent." This  representative agent
maximizes  the expected  present value  of her lifetime  utility flows.  The discount factor in
the present value calculations  is the individual's  subjective  time preference factor B for
discounting  the value of utility  a period away.  The expectation  of all flows  is taken as of a
reference time period 0. In  each period of time t, the individual's  well-being U is a
smooth, quasiconcave  function of the number of current births, St, the current stock of
children or family  size, Mt, current consumption  of market goods Ct, current leisure Lt,
and  a  once-and-for-all preference shock e  realized at  the  initial  period  0.  More
concisely,  the representative  individual  solves  the problem
(2.1)  maxinize E0 co  PtU(St,Mt,Ct,Lt;G)]
where Mt = Mt1  + St. The expectation  Et is the individual's  subjective  expectation  at the
beginning  of period t of variables dated t and later, given some information that the
individual  is presumed to know at time t. RS do not say explicitly  what variables are in
this time t information  set but it may be supposed that all variables  that are dated t and
earlier are legitimate information  variables  at time t. They do make the assumption that
the subjective  expectations  of individuals  are equal to expectations  calculated  based on the
analyst's  assumed distributions  for the random variables in the model (i.e., expectations
are U'ationall'9
As in most economic  choice models  the individual's  freedom to choose is restricted,
in this case by  two sets of constraints-budget constraints  at t:
(2.2)  wt(L*-Lt)  + It > PtCt + qtMt + rtZt
where L  is total time of the individual;  wt is the wage  rate at t; It is husband's  income at
t, Zt a variable denoting whether contraception was in use; and pt,qt,rt are the market
prices  of consumption  goods,  children,  and contraception,  respectively.  Note that in RS the
cost of regulation is purely a  market cost, although it is easy enough to extend their
framework  to include any psychic  costs by including  Zt in the utility  function.  A dichotomy
is thus drawn here between these two kinds  of costs in terms of how they enter the model.
Compare  this with the EC framework  in which  both attributes of cost  are lumped together
in total regulation  cost RC, and affect all variables  only through  their use-equation (1.2).
The second and more relevant constraint for this approach is what RS call the
'§eproduction  function."  This is the analog of several proximate  determinants  equations,
16one for each period t, with somewhat  different  proximate  determinants  from the ones RS
and earlier researchers had used. Let us now drop the assumption of a representative
individual  and instead indexindividuals  byi=l,...,I. All variables  above  would  then take on
a superscript  i in addition to the time-subscript  t. The ith indiviualPs  reproduction  function
is defined by RS as
(2.3)  St =  + / 1(a1+t) + 92Z' + f
where Si and Zt are as defined previously,  ai+t is the ith individual's  age at time t, el is a
stochastic disturbance, pl  and p2 are fixed coefficients  to be estimated, and A  is an
individual-varying  but time-invariant  intercept (also to be estimated). This last term, 14
has the interpretation  of being the ith individual's  specific  fertility  component  or individual
fecundity,  partly  known by the individual,  but unobservable  to the researcher. The other
important  property  of  is that while  it is correlated  with the realized  number  of birth S
it is assumed to be  uncorrelated  uuith  pre,.  i 7ences over number of births, family size,
consumption,  or leisure.
The individual then chooses levels of  leisure, market goods, consumption,  and
cnntraceptive  use in each period to solve (2.1) subjct  to (2.2) and (2.3). She takes all
prices, husband's  income, total available time, and the reproduction  parameters Al, P29
and possibly  i}  as given. In addition, as we indicated above, it is assumed that at each
time period t all decisions and outcomes  that occurred prior to t are known, and this
includes  the time-4nvariant  preference  shock e. Neither Si nor Mt are known until after
period t when  the random shock  e is realized.
In principle,  this model can be solved  for the optimal levels of leisure, consumption,
and contraceptive  use at each period t, however,  as intimated in the seminal work of
Wolpin (1984),  closed-form solutions are very difficult to obtain for relatively simple
specifications  of  the  utility function U.  Hence, RS  concentrate on  estimating the
reproduction  function (2.3) with specific  attention to estimating  the individual  fecundity
component,  given that individuals  are choosing  Zt optimally.  They do provide, however,
some theoretical  results that come  out of a two-period version of the above model. The
gist of their comparative-static  theoretical  results  are
i.  An increase in Mt, the current stock of children,  that is known to come  from
17an increase in  el, will increase the likelihood of contraceptive use in the
succeeding  period as long as contraceptive  costs are 'low enough."
ii.  If individuals know their own fecundity  level,  ,  an observed increase in
family  size Ml that is not known  to be due entirely to the random shock el, will
have the  effect of  increasing the  likelihood of  contraceptive use  in  the
succeeding  period by more than in (1) above.  This is because individuals
know  that part of the increase in family  size is due to their being relatively
more fecund.
iii.  If individuals  don't know  p,  an observed increase in Mt will still lead to an
greater likelihood  of contraception  in the succeeding  period than in (i) above.
This is because  individuals  guess that part of the increase in family size might
be due to a higher fecundity  level.
Also, as a  theoretical note, were one to solve out the  RS model, one  couldjn
principle, get  a  demand  function for  contraception that  is  analogous to  the  EC
reduced-form equation (1.2'). This would relate contraceptive  use levels to eXDgenous
things in the RS model,  like market costs of contraception.  It is likewise  possible to get an
estimate of the EC potential supply  by calculating  the reproduction  function  at each t with
3  set to zero. With a few assumptions  it is even possible to get an analog to the EC
demand concept:  assume that individuals  know  and that there is no randomness et; if
the model is then solved  for contraception  levels at rt= 0 using  these contraception  levels
to calculate Si and then summing over t  we obtain a  corresponding concept to the t
'Uemand"  for children  in EC.
2.2.2.  Empirical  Implementftion.
As indicated,  RS do not undertake the unenviably  difficult  task of solving out the
dynamic  program  for a set of pintly estimable  ferdlity demand and supply  equations. They
do, instead, adopt the compromise  strategy  of estimating  the reproduction  equation (2.3)
(which has characteristics  of  a fertility supply equation), reserving (2.1) and (2.2) as
background  considerations  for the selection of instruments and interpretation of results.
18The unfortunate  weakness  of this strategy  is that all of the interesting dynamics  of the
theoretical model are lost due to the time-aggregation  procedure that that gets them an
estimating  equation;  the version  of (2.3) that gets to be estimated below does not feature
any dynamic  simultaneity  or lagged adjustment  in either the structural equation or the
instrumental-variables  equation of their two-stage  least squares procedure.  Consequently,
like the EC model,  the empirical  expression  of the RS model is also properly regarded as
a static lifetime  choice  specification.
The mechanics  of their empirical  study  are as follows:
I.  Take (2.3) and divide by the number of time periods T to get an "average
fertility"  equation:
(2.3')  gi = 4  + 4  + A2Zi  +
where S' is now the average fertility  over T periods of the ith individual  (i.e.,
the birth rate); and Z' is the proportion  of T periods that contraception  was in
use. Under the presumption  that the analyst does not know i,  estimation  of
(2.3')  by OLS  is biased and inconsistent,  because  the explanatory  variable  Zi is
correlated  with the joint error term 4 + i.  Correlation  with 4  follows  from
results (ii)-(iii) above: more fecund individuals  tend to self-select into more
rigorous  contraceptive  regimes.  Correlation  with e proceeds  from the fact that
the  realizations  t,  ft-1'  et-2'  etc., which are  components of  the  mean
are among the information variables that the individual uses to form her
choice  of Z,ZI  zl  which  in turn are components  of 2'.  This requires
an instrumental-variables  procedure  like that adopted in EC.
I.  The authors argue that 'bince F [i.e., 2'  above] reflects the couple's demand
for children,  it is a function  of preferences,  prices, and [husband's]  income.  As
long as these variables are orthogonal [i.e., uncorrelated] to fecundity,  the
usual set of fertility demand variables may serve as instruments for F and
permit  identification  of the supply  technology."  (Rosenzweig  and Schultz,  1985,
p.998.)  Hence, step II consists  of estimating  an equation like the following  by
19OLS or  a Tobit regression (one would favor a Tobit procedure if  a large
enough proportion  of sample  data on t  were zero):
(2.4)  =  o+  4+
where (i is a random error and i  are averages  of "the usual set of fertility
demand  variables," (e.g.,  personal  characteristics, market  goods  prices,
husband's  income,  etc. See RS (1985)  for a detailed list of these instruments.)
m.  Using now the estimates of  p  and  y obtained in (II)  construct predicted
values  of Z1 from the sample of i  and use these predicted values in place of
Z' in (2.3'). Estimate (2.4) by OLS estimation  of (2.3')  with  +  as the joint
error term. This will  supply  us with consistent  estimates  for A and 2.
IV.  The remaining  problem is to obtain a consistent  estimate of g0. This is easy if
we understand  that the mean error  in (2.3') is zero for large T. Hence, the
difference  between S' and p.1+p 2V  ( ul  and /2  are the estimates obtained
from step M) is a consistent  estimate lb of AO
2.2.3.  Evaluation  of the RS Model.
Several  remarks are in order; we will first consider  some technical  comments  on the
RS empirical  strategy  and then turn to the larger issue of comparing  the theoretical model
of RS with  that of EC.
We have already noted above that  the  time-aggregation employed in  the  RS
estimation strategy identifies and allows for consistent estimation of the reproduction
equation parameters  l, and p2, but the price of this is that aggregation  reduces the
empirical  model to one of static lifetime  choice  behavior.  Consequently,  one cannot  ask of
equations (2.3') and (2.4) questions  like 'Eow will greater access to contraception  affect
the timing  or spacing  of births and the age distribution  of the future population?"  or 'Does
birth spacing  increase with parity?"
Secondly,  with respect to the empirical  implementation  discussed  in I-III above, the
20first obvious question that one has is how reasonable are the "usual set of fertility demand
variables" that RS select in terms of their orthogonality to the combined error  term 4  -
ei? While there are  theoretical grounds for such orthogonality to actually be the  case, i:
would have been reassuring in their  1985 study if RS had reported some test  against this
null hypothesis applied to (2.3').9
Lastly, observe  that  the  relationship  between  the  empirical  equations  that  RS
actually estimate  and  the  underlying dynamic program is  not  all  that  tight.  Instead  of
solving the model, or some specific versions of it, they go ahead and directly estimate the
reduced-form  for  contraceptive  use  (2.4)  and  then  the  time-aggregated  reproduction
equation (2.3'). It  is an open question  therefore  as to how seriously misspecified is the
estimation procedure based only on equations (2.4) and (2.3').
Consider the original dynamic programming problem (2.1)-(2.3). Under the original
theory it not unreasonable  to  suppose that the  reduced-form  (2.4) is a function also of
individual preference shocks ei.  What happens if some of these time-invariant  preference
shocks are also unobservable like the time invariant fecundity shock 4?  One would have,
instead, a pint  shock el+4  which remains unobservable to the analyst. There is still hope
for consistent estimates of the reproduction function parameters A, and p2 as long as 'the
usual  set of fertility demand  variables' that are wued  as instrments  :i  in (2.4) remain
uncorrelated  (orthogonal)  to this joint shock Unfortunately, this may not be true for the set
of  personal  characteristics that  are  typically included in  the  RS  instrumental-variable
regression (2.4). Further, even if these variables are  dropped so that A, and  2  can be
consistently estimated, one cannot arrive at a consistent estimate of ,4  separately (or ei
for that matter), only a consistent estimate of the sum ei+p4.  Thus one cannot analyze the
effects of isolated changes in 4 on fertility variables or other variables of policy interest.
To  handle  this  possibility one  suggestion is  to  allow  for  an  individual-varying
intercept g  in (2.4) to capture the unobservable preference shocks ei. We would have to
reformulate (2.4) as
Zt  = (pi  +  VP  +  et
One could then obtain consistent "within"  estimates of  1 given enough observations t for
21each individual  i. This approach,  of course, is more demanding on the data set since it
requires a time series for each observed  individual.
We now turn to a comparison  of the theoretical RS model (2.1j-2.3)  vis-a-vis its
competitor,  the EC model of Section  1 above.  From a theorist's viewpoint  the RS model is
certainly more satisfying in  terms of  the  way economic behavior is  specified. The
advantage  of stating the behavioral problem in an explicit form is that confusion  in the
interpretation of the outcomes of choice behavior is minimized.  Moreover, because the
estimating equations have a foundation in a  rigorous theoretical structure we can be
somewhat  more confident  about what misspecifications  might be important,  and which  are
not.  The  resulting equations that  RS  estimate are  thus  less sensitive to  potential
correlation problems between fertility control variables such as contraception and the
fertility  equation error, though as discussed  above,  they are not entirely free of them. And
again, despite this the original EC study was careful to address the correlation problem.
To study the effect of changes in structural variables (such as unobserved shocks to
preferences),  appropriate modifications  of the theory and estimating  models are easy to
introduce  since  the formal structure  of the model  is explicit.
Another nice feature of the theoretical RS model is  that the stochastic side is
modelled more  explicitly than  in  EC.  One  knows exactly what  type of  stochastic
disturbances  the model regards as important and hows these enter the decision-making
problem of individuals making fertility choices, and how these shocks carry over into
relationships derived from the  basic maximization program. In  the  EC  framework
preferences  (demands)  and the reproduction  function  are regarded as subject to stochastic
shocks  which  may or may not be uncorrelated  across  equations, which  may or may not be
correlated with regressors, etc. The payoff to using the more theoretically  rigorous RS
approach  is that the analyst  is better able to identify  and handle specific  nonorthogonality
problems appearing in  the  fertility equation than would a  naive application of  the
proximate  determinants  approach.
The precision with which the RS model is specified, while useful in identifying
potential problems,  as well as new  results, may become a drawback,  however,  if flexibility
rather than precision  is important for the purposes  to which the model will be used. One
advantage  of the EC framework  over RS, apart from its simplicity  of structure,  is that it is
more easily adapted to suit special needs-one  could include more variables  (like direct
policy)  or extend  the basic  model to explain  other variables  in terms of more fundamental
causal factors,  albeit in an ad hoc fashion.  One need not worry  about the microfoundations
of  behavior. The down side of this is that there are applications  of  a model (policy
simulation  is one) where knowledge  of the theoretical structure of the model is valuable
22and the lack of microfoundations  may be damaging  to policy  inference.
The practical value of  the RS model, in terms of explanatory power, predictive
performance,  and policy  usefulness,  is still an open question. It is still not demonstrably
superior for policy  studies of fertility  than other approaches,  notably  that of EC (correctly
estimated.).  Since,  from a historical  standpoint,  there has been a strong policy  motivation
behind this line of research,  whether  the RS approach  gets to be broadly  adopted may well
lie in the hands  of policy-oriented  users  rather than the academic  consumers  of the model.
The other characteristic  of the RS model that works against its wider usage are the data
requirements  for model implementation.  To carry out time-aggregation .In  the estimation
procedure requires the use of data that is both cross-sectional  and time-series, as the
1970 U.S. National Fertility Survey  and the 1975  resurvey which they used in their 1985
study. The RS model cannot exploit most existing data sets, which are either purely
cross-sectional  or purely  time-series  in structure.
Data requirements  not.:thstanding, the RS model remains a serious competitor to
the more widely-used  EC framework  for several good reasons: its rigorous theoretical
structure,  its explicit  treatment of the stochastic  shocks on behavior, better handling of
stock and flow variables as  well as  simultaneous relationships. Potentially, the  RS
theoretical framework  may be further developed  to admit the empirical study  of lagged
and  simultaneous dynamic relations between fertility variables. Such a  study could
potentially  exploit  its close relationship  with other stochastic dynamic  models of fertility
choice to provide guidance about stylized  results, and to cross-check or buttress novel
empirical  findings.  In its present form, the empirical  RS model is of limited  usefulness  for
the analysis  of flow  fertility  variables  as opposed  to stock variables.
3. Montgomery.
In this section  we rzview  a reformulation  of the EC framework  that first appeared in
an  article by M. Montgomery  (Demography,  1987). The Montgomery  model, like its
predecessors,  falls under the category  of static fertflity models. Though descended  from
the EC model, it is a  considerable  revision upon the original EC model and can be
regarded  as an independent  model  in its own right.
The principal  motivation behind Montgomery's  reformulation is the criticism that
had been levelled  at the EC concept  of demand for children (see Schultz's  1986  review).
As has been discussed  previously,  the EC demand concept  suffers from several problems
of interpretation.  Montgomery  avoids all of these problems by allowing  the demand for
children to depend upon regulation costs in the standard way that economic demand
23curves  are defined.  The principal  advantage  of this reformulation  is that by redefining  the
concept  of demand  for fertility in the standard way,  one can then access the large body of
standard (hence, less controversial)  analytical  techniques  for estimating demand systems
that  had  previously gone unexploited. The  cost  of  this  reformulation is  that  one
distinguishing  feature of the EC framework,  its one-way causal relationships,  is no longer
preserved.
3.1.  Theory.
Imagine,  as in the EC model, that individuals  make a lifetime decision as to how
many surviving  children  they would  like to have, together with how much of market goods
they would  like to consume.  Now, however,  they must also choose these jointly with the
level of contraceptive  effort required to realize their desired family  size. Formally,  assume
individuals  maximize  a utility function that depends on lifetime consumption  C, family
size, S, and 'Eontraceptive  effort,"  Z:
(3.1)  U(C,S,Z) =  C(°O.S  11.Z £2 ;  with cro,  a,  > 0 and a2 < 0.
In Montgomery's  model contraceptive  effort, Z is defined as
(3.2)  Z = B/N
where  B = maximum  number of expected  births
N = expected  number  of births
S in turn, is the product  of a (given)  survival  rate r (this is l-x7 in terms of the original  EC
model)  and N:
(3-3)  S =rN
The number B is presumed  given to and known by the individual  but is unobservable  to
the analyst.  Elementary  substitutions  allow us to write U as a function  of consumption  C,
births N, the and the fihed  numbers ao. al,  I12, B, and r:
24ac  al 1-2  'a 2 a 1 (3.1')  U(C,N;B,r) = C  u.N  1  .B  1r
Note that for this choice  of utility  function,  changes  in maximum  expected  births B and in
survival rates r essentially  rescale individual utility  levels exponentially,  but don't affect
the rate at which  individuals  trade off less C for more N to maintain  welfare U at a given
(fixed)  level.  We will  have more to say  on this below.
Individuals  then choose  C and N to maximize  (3.1') subject  to two constraints.  There
is a lifetime  budget  constraint
(3.4)  1 > pC + qS
=pC  + qrN
where p and q are the lifetime costs of each unit of C and each unit of N respectively.
T1here  is also a rationing  constraint  which  just says  that expected  births cannot exceed the
(unobservable)  maximum  expected  births:
(3.5)  N < B.
It  will be observed that  the budget constraint does not include any market costs of
regulation,  though  it is easy enough to incorporate these. The psychic  costs of regulation,
however,  do appear  in this model via the presence  of contraceptive  use Z as an argument
of the utility  function  (3.1) (and  12 is negative).  Although  Z gets to be substituted  out in
(3.1'), the psychic  costs continue  to be manifest in the form of the parameter a2. Hence
the demand for children will depend (negatively)  on regulation costs. This is why the
Montgomery  model is a significant  departure away  from the EC framework. 10
Although  in Montgomery's  model the independence  of demand  from causal effects
emanating from  regulation costs is  gone,  Montgomery is  able  to  preserve  the
decomposition  of  the  EC supply of  births concept into proximate determinants. 'his
observation  is important as it allows  Montgomery  to later estimate the maximum  number
of expected  births  B as a linear sum  of proximate  determinants  x
Figure 2  represents  this  model  informally, using standard indifference-curve
diagrams:
25In figure 2. the shaded area represents those combinations  of  consumption and
births which  are feasible given  prices,  income,  and the biological-demographic  parameters
B and r. U1 and U2 are representative  indifference  curves  of two different individuals,
one of whom faces a b,nding  rationing  constraint.  In the diagram  individuals  who are not
supply-constrained  (for whom B .>  T  in the diagram)  will end up choosing  a level of N*
which is  strictly less than  the  maximum level of births, as  on  point °1-  2or  such
individuals the operative constraint on the number of births comes from the  demand
side-tending  to have relatively  stronger preferences  for consumption  over children, they
voluntarily  choose  to restrict their births to levels lower than the natural maximum  B. On
the other hand, individuals  with preferences  like U2 would  like to attain a point like °1  in
the diagram where their utility  level is highest subject to the budget constraint. Because,
however,  of the rationing  constraint  the best that they can do is the corner solution 02.
For individuals  represented  by U1, their choice  of realized  births and consumption  is
given  by the interior solution  01 . This solution  is
(3.6a)  N*  (a 1 -=2)  I
L  (a0+*1-a2)]  l  qr ]
(3.6b)  C*  a  ]  [I]
(0+al-"2).  P-
For individuals  represented  by U2, theirs is the corner  solution
(3.7a)  N* = B
.I  - qrB
(3.7b)  C* =l
Inasmuch  as the sample contains  individuals  whose solutions  are described by (3.6)
and  individuals described  by  (3.7)  it  will  become  important  in  the  empirical
implementation  of this model to take this into account. Before turning to the empirical
implementation  and issues, however, let us make a short detour into some technical
aspects of the theory that have relevance to how one might study the effects of specific
types  of '%aodernization"  in the Montgomery  framework.
26A  fair  amount  of  the  policy research  that  followed the  lead  of  The  Fertirity
Revolution  was  concerned  with  estimating  the  effects  of  various  measures  of
modernization  on  births  and  related  economic  choices (refer  back  to  Section  1.2.1,
specifically equation (1.3) of the  EC model.) In modelling the  effects of modernization
and  policy, it would be convenient, where possible, to be able to isolate  those effects of
modernization and policy acting aokly on the  survival rate  r or  the  maximum expected
births  B.  This  way,  one  might  focus  directly on  the  effect  of  specific  measures  of
modernization  on  the  supply-side  structures  of  the  budget  and  rationing  constraints
without having to be concerned about any confounding effects on preferences  (the utility
function) and the demand side of  the fertility decision. While modernization  in  general
does  affect relative  prices, preferences, and  incomes, it  may be  reasonable  that  some
specific types of modernization affect only B or r but not the preference  parameters  ao,
a,,  and c2.
For  example, improvements  in  medical procedures might lead  to  longer  fertility
lifetimes,  which  in  turn  would  increase  B.  One  could  suppose  that  this  type  of
modernization would not  affect individual preferences between consumption and family
size. In Montgomery's framework, this independence of modernization effects on  B from
effects  on  preferences  is  guaranteed.  Looking at  the  utility function (3.1')  shows that
higher B affects the kvel of utility U by the factor of B raised to the power a,  but at any
fined level of utility like U1 or U2 in the diagram, the slope of the indifference curve U is
independent of B:
dC  I  ___2
aWIU fJ,d  [a1  ]  N[  ]
Since changes in  B do  not  affect the  budget constraint, modernization  that  works to
increase B will fail to change fertility outcomes once the rationing constraint fails to bind.
(Note that B is nowhere to be found in equations (3.6a) and (3.6b) for optimal C and N.)
In this way the Montgomery model captures very nicely the EC notion of how, as societies
modernize,  fertility  becomes  less  supply-constrained  and  more  demand-constrained.
There  is  an  interesting,  and  novel result  here,  though. Observe  that  as  the  rationing
constraint becomes nonbinding, any further increases in  B (due  to  modernization,  say)
lowers  rather than raises overall utility and welfare. This is because it forces individuals to
adopt morc rigorous contraceptive efforts, which in turn detracts rather than adds to utility
(i.e., a2 is typically  negative.) This runs counter to the principle that relaxing a constraint
27cannot  bring  welfare down,  and  also  to  the  seat-of-the-pants  presumption  that
modernization  makes  one better off  unambiguously.
The sharp separation between supply-ide effects  and preference effects of changes
in B is possible  because  of the special  form of the utility  function  adopted by Montgomery.
The Cobb-Douglas  form (3.1a)  guarantees  that the curvature  of the indifference  curves  is
not affected by changes in B. For more general specifications  of U  the slopes of the
indifference curves may depend B so that modernization  acting through B might have
demand-side  effects  as well.
As for modernization  that increases  the survival  rate r, in Montgomery's  model this
again has no effect on the slope of the indifference curves (hence, has no impact on
tradeoffs  on the demand  side.) The difference  is that unlike changes  in B, changing  r will
have an impact or  the slope of the budget constraint represented in figure 2, even if
relative prices q/p  and real income I/p  remains unchanged. An increase in r will thus
result in a smaller N with consumption  C unchanged.  The level of utility,  however,  may go
up or down  because  U gets scaled up by the factor of the change  in r raised to power a,
(refer back to equation (3.1').) This offsets the drop in N. Modernization  acting through
changes  in r thus has an ambiguous  effect on welfare depending  on parameters including
those that reflect preferences (ao, a1, and a2.) This is yet another new result, which
hopefully  might  be examined  empirically.
3.2. Estimation.
Montgomery's  estimation strategy is  a  simple and  elegant  application of  the
technique  of switching  regressions.  First, we can regard the sample observations  of N and
B as being  realizations  or draws  from one of two  regimes,  the first regime being
(3.8)  N=  X+ 
and the second  regime being
(3.9)  N=B=  X2.x+
where xis a vector of exDgenous  variables"l affecting  demand, the constraint,  or both of
these. (Some exclusion  restrictions on the parameters will be necessary  to identify (3.8)
from (3.9)-to  be identified from each other the two equations cannot share the exact
28same set of x variables.)
The problem is that the analyst does not know the level B. To get around this,
Montgomery  employs the following  additional identification  criterion. If the individual
ever used contraception  she should be classified  as a draw from the first regime. If she
never used contraception,  she is a draw from the second regime, since for individuals  in
this  regime optimal family size exceeds the  upper limit B, obviating the  need  to
contracept.  This classifies  the sample  into two subsamples,  one for each regression.
One then could go ahead and estimate (3.8) and (3.9) by OLS but because of the
truncated sample (regime 1 is truncated above at the level B; besides we never observe
negative  values  of N or B in either regime) the Tobit procedure is called for to estimate
the switching  regressions  model (3.8)(3.9). (Again,  for details on the Tobit procedure,  a
good reference  is Maddala, 1983.)  Under this procedure the contribution  to the sample
likelihood  of observations  from regime 1 is
(3.10)  [11/o 1 *  0[(N-_  x)/u 1J
where al is the standard deviation  of  1 and 0 the normal probability  density function.
The contribution  to the sample  likelihood  from observations  in regime 2 is
(3.11)  1 - $[(N - A 2 x)/o 21
where v  is the normal cumulative  density  function  and a2 the Tobit standard error of  2
A pint  likelihood function can then be  constructed and maximized  by choice of the
parameters  (A A2 1,o,2)  using  the full sample clasdfied  according  to (3.10)  or (3.11).
The  above procedure delvers  consistent estimates of  the  model parameters,
however,  Montgomery  notes that it may be possible to get more 'bfficient"  (i.e., smaller
variance) estimates. This proceeds from a reinterpretation of  the earlier EC demand
concept in the context of  Montgomery's  theoretical model. Suppose, as  Montgomery
argues,  that survey  responses  to ideal family  size questions  measure  the demand for births
N in the hypothetical  situation  of no psychic  regulation  costs  (a2 = 0) and assured survival
(r = 1). Then this implies that we have an additional  equation restricting  the purameters
of (3.6a) and (3.7a). Imposing  this restriction in the subsequent Tobit estimations will
increase  the precision  of the estimates,  though,  again, this extra restriction  is not necessary
for consistent  estimation.
293.3. An Evaluation.
At the 'tost" of introducing  simultaneity  into the model (which some might even
consider a desirable thing) Montgomery  is able to do away with much of the confusion
surrounding  the demand concept of Easterlin and Crimmins without losing any other
useful features  of the original EC model. Adopting  the Montgomery  reformulation  allows
one  to  apply tried  and  tested  approaches to  demand estimation. In  addition, the
Montgomery  reformulation also makes some novel predictions of its own about how
modernization acting  through  supply-ide  channels affect welfare. We  regard  the
Montgomery  model, therefore, as a separate important alternative to modelling  lifetime
fertility decisions.  The other significant  advantage of the Montgomery  model is that it
makes no more requirements on the data than those essentially imposed by the  EC
framework.  Data sets for implementing  this model abound.
The principal  limitation  of Montgomery's  model is that, like the EC and RS models,
it is a static lifetime fertility choice model. The principal variable of that all these static
models seek to explain is total births over the individual's life-cyde; one still cannot
properly analyze questions of birth timing and birth spacing or intertemporal tradeoffs
between  children  and other goods.  To address these questions  requires the use of a model
that generates  estimating  equations  which  are dynamic.
Dynamic Moddg of Fert  Choice.
We have  noted that all three previous  models  are essentially  models  that have been
used to  explore the  economics of  lifetime fertlity.  Recent research on  the  fertility
decision,  however,  has been oriented more towards the analysis  of the spacing decision
over time and under uncertainty.  While this reflects,  in part, the same trend in other areas
of economics,  it is also a conscious  attempt on the part of researchers  to overcome  many
of the Limitations  of static models. Static models do not capture the sequential nature of
the  fertility decision. Static models cannot adequately address questions about  how
changes  in the time profik of costs of contraception,  wages,  incomes,  mother's education,
or mortality  risks affect either completed family size or  the spacing  of children. Static
models which assign consumption value  to  children also  neglect the  durable  and
irreversible  characteristic  of children as consumption  goods. At the same time there exist
stylized empirical regularities which have dynamic characteristics.  Examples are  the
apparent convergence of  fertility rates  in developing countries (World Development
30Report, 1984),  the tendency  of births to be more narrowly-spaced  among higher fertility
women,  the tendency  for women to space births as "parity"  (i.e., attained fertility level)
increases,  the finding  that current and future levels of the woman's  wage and husband's
income are important  in explaining  the number of births and the timing  of the first birth
(Heckman  and Walker, 1990),  the observation  that recent U.S. fertility  levels  appear to be
countercyclical  to the business  cycle  (Mocan,  1989),  etc.
Finally, the need to introduce more general and "realistic"  types of  uncertainty
reflecting patterns of  serial correlation and correlations with time-varying levels of
economic  or biological  variables  require the use of an explicitly  dynamic  framework.
In this section we review three such dynamic models each of which emphasizes
different aspects  of the dynamic  fertility decision.  These are, respectively,  the model of
Wolpin (1984), Newman (1988), and Barro and Becker (1988, 1989). Given that this
research program  is in relative infancy,  it is difficult to tell which of these models will
prove to  be seminal for the  empirical end of future research. While the  underlying
theoretical framework  is very similar for this class of models,  it has been observed that
when it comes to estimation there has not appeared a consensus  about the appropriate
empirical model to use. In this review,  therefore, we will provide more details on the
theoretical structure of  the  class of  dynamic stochastic models and  the  predicted
theoretical relationships,  although we do discuss  various estimation  strategies that have
been suggested  by this literature. Readers interested mainly  in the details of econometric
specifications  and empirical results of these dynamic  models should consult the original
references  to supplement  the discussion  below.
4. WolDin.
4.1. Model.
One of the seminal papers in the dynamic  approach to fertility choice is Wolpin
(1984).  Since  his model contains  several  features that exemplify  a distinct  approach  to the
modelling  of fertility  dynamics,  we  examine  it in some detail.
Like  other dynamic  models  that are reviewed  here Wolpin  sets up an intertemporal
maximization  problem which is truly dynamic in the sense that present decisions are
forward-ooking  and past outcomes  affect future outcomes.  His model is set up in discrete
time periods,  with each period being measured as that length of time over which  a birth
can occur.  In each period of her lifetime  the individual  receives  utility  from consumption
of market goods  in the period and the existing  stock of children  for the period only.  Let
31the period utility  function  be U(Ct,Mt)  where Ct is current consumption  and Mt the stock
of children.
The model accommodates three  types of  uncertainty, a  random shock to  the
individual's  utility  function  (which  reflects changes  in tastes over time), randomness about
the occurrence of infant mortality in every period of life, and randomness in current
income.  Births are assumed  to occur only in the fertile stage of life, however the duration
of this is known  with certainty to be Tf periods. This last assumption  is made largely  for
tractability  reasons.
Uncertainty  makes it such that at any instant in her lifetime the individual knows
current and past outcomes but can only form guesses about the likely future values of
relevant variables. Given uncertainty, at  the  onset  of  her fertile  lifetime (t=O) the
individual  is be taken to maximize  the expected  value  of the discounted  sum of period utility
over her lifetime t=0,.,  .,.  T (including in:f.rtile periods):
(4.1)  E  ET=  6t.U(CtfMt,4t)
where 6 is the individual's subjective  discount factor and Eoxt represents the rational
expectation  at time 0 (i.e., the true statistical  expectation  of xt conditioned  on information
available  in the first period of the decision  problem.)  The period utility function  has been
extended  to include random influences t. In his original  model Wolpin  posits a quadratic
utility  function  of a specific  type:
(4.2)  U(Ct,Mt,Ct)  = (a1 +  t)Mt - "A  + /lXt  +  2Xt  + 7MtXt.
We will  not dwell  too much on the implications  of choosing  this particular functional  form
over other possible  forms. We note only that (i) a quadratic form for period utility  implies
that downside  and upside risks to Ct and Mt are weighted equally, and that (ii) the
inclusion  of the shock  ft to preferences  for children  matters later on for the estimation.
The second  type of uncertainty  involves  the probability  of infant mortality.  Wolpin
assumes  that the stock  of children  Mt evolves  according  to
(4.3)  M  t = M  t_l  + n  t - dt
where the birth process  nt equals 1 if a birth occurs  in the period, and zero otherwise;  the
death process  dt equals 1 if the child born in period t dies, and zero if the child goes on to
32  _live to the next period. For simplicity  Wolpin assumes that children live forever (i.e,
outlive their parents) if they survive  the first period of life, citing evidence that most of
child mortality  occurs in the first few years of life. Death occurs if  the value of an
indicator  function  falls below  zero:
(4 4)  d  t  ~~~~=  ° iff Gt  7r + ut > o
(4.4)  dt  = 1 iff G07r+  u  < O
where Gt is a vector  of variables  related to the likelihood  of a death occurring  (examples
might be  household characteristics,  community  variables, policy variables, biological
determinants,  and time itself.) The randomness  of death comes from the inclusion  of a
random term  ut, which  is assumed  independent  and identically  distributed.
The third type of uncertainty  involves  shocks to household  income. These shocks
affect  the sequence  of budget  constraints  (one for each period) that the individual  faces:
(4A)  Ct + b(nt-dt) + cnt = It
where b is the per unit maintenance  cost of surviving  children,  c is the cost per unit of a
birth in period t, and It is household  real income,  measured in terms of the consumption
good.  ( Observe  that the prices  b and c are assumed  constant  over time. Note as weUl  that
that the maintenance  costs are assumed to be expended  on the surviving  children for the
period t only,  not for the entire stock  of children alive in period t. Finaly note also that
there is no saving  or wealth accumulation  in this model; the only means of transforming
income today into future utility is through having children as the stock of children Mt
appears in the period utility function for future periods.) Income is assumed random,
obeying  the process
(4-5)  It =Ht*+  vt
where Ht are exogenous  determinants  of income (e.g., age) and vt is an independent,
identicaUy  distributed  random variable  with  zero mean and finite  variance.
The basic  problem  of the Wolpin  model may now be stated:  the individual  chooses  a
sequence  of birt  {nt}hOs  T and consumptions  {0Jt=o  Tto maximize  (4.1) subject  to
(4.2)-(4.5).
334.2. Disusion.
What are the distinguishing  features of  Wolpin's theoretical model that make it
representative  of a particular  approach  to fertility  dynamics?  The important ones are:
i.  The model assumes that individuals  have perfect control over their fertility
levels, hence the occurence  of a birth nt is regarded as  a variable that the
individual  can choose  directly.
ii.  In relation to (i), there are no explicit costs of regulating births, only costs
incurred  if a birth occurs.
iii.  Individuals  have no control  over the death process  or the interval over which a
child  is exposed  to the risk of death.
iv.  There is no  capital or  wealth accumulation. Intertemporal substitution is
carried out by  having  more children.
V.  Uncertainty  enters by way of randomness in income levels and shocks to
preferences  over family  size.
Less  important  distinguishing  features  of the model are that
vi.  Child  births and deaths  in each period are modelled  as zero-one processes.
vii.  The duration  of the fertfle period of life Tf is known  with  certainty.
viii. Maintenance  costs apply  only to new  additions  to the flow  of surviving  children
in the period, nt-dt, not to the entire stock  of children,  Mt.
ix.  Prices  are assumed  steady  over the life cycle.
x  The model is set up in discrete  time.
34These last four features are less important as distinguishing  characteristics,  since
they can be  changed without affecting the  main conclusions  of  the  Wolpin model.
According  to Wolpin,  the main analytical  results  are that:
i.  The model can generate a wide variety of timing and spacing patterns for
births.
ii.  The model can generate a wide variety  of replacement  patterns  for children.
iii.  It  is (unfortunately) not generally the  case that  high fertility incidence is
associated  with regimes  of high  infant mortality.
The last result is a consequence  of the stylized  assumption  that a child is assured
survival  for future periods if it survives  the first life period. Under this assumption  it will
be typical  for optimizing  individuals  to raise fertility  only after a death has occured. It is
somewhat  unfortunate  in the sense that most evidence  from developing  areas appear to
indicate that high  infant mortality  is positively  associated  with higher  fertility  levels.
4.3. Estimation.
Estimating  a dynamic  programming  model  generally  requires the adoption of one of
several strategies:  one can either (a) estimate  general structural  or reduced-form relations
which  are indirectly  related to the theoretical model,  (b) solve  the dynamic  programming
model for the exact closed-form  expressions  of the structural relations (i.e., the function
describing  optimal  choice  of births and consumption  as a function  of structural  parameters
such as the utility  function  parameters,  the parameters  of the death and income processes)
and then estimate these closed-form  expressions,  (c) should closed-form  expressions  for
the individual's  decision rules be unavailable  carry out a iterative numerical estimation
procedure.  Rosenzweig  and Schultz,  in the model reviewed  in Section 2 above, adopted
strategy  (a) although they did so in a way  that made the estimating  model nondynamic  in
structure. Newman  (1989), in the model we review next, is able to obtain closed-form
solutions  that are potentially  estimable  and retain the dynamic  character of the model.  In
Wolpin's  model  deriving  closed-form  expressions  for lifetimes  longer than two-periods  is
extremely  difficult,  if not impossible,  hence Wolpin's  study  employs  strategy  (c).
Wolpin's  estimation procedure is itself simple in principle, but the mechanics  of
deriving and  calculating the  mathematical expressions involved can  get  extremely
35complicated  very  quickly.  Rather than go through all the derivations  here, we just present
the core of the procedure  and refer the reader to the original  source for details.
Wolpin sets out  to estimate the  preference parameters aj,ac2X, 1,#2,E the  price
parameters  b,c and  the  discount rate  #.  (In  his  ectual  empirical specification he
generalizes the  functional forms  for  utility and  costs and  thus  adds  some  extra
parametera.)  In addition,  one would  like estimates of the other parameters which appear
in the decision  rule that the individual  uses in determining  whether or not a birth should
occur.
Estimation  is based on the following  relation:  let LUt be the value  of lifetime utility
from period t onwards,  let ft continue to denote the preference shock, and let Pt be the
probability  at t that an infant will survive  into the next period. Given the quadratic form of
utility (which  essentially weights upside and downside  risks symmetrically  in the utility
sense), Wolpin  now argues that whether it is optimal to have a birth in the period or not
depends  upon the indicator  function:
(4.6)  Jt = Et[LUtI  nt= ,1t=0] - Et[LUt  I  nt=0,4t=0] + Ptet
The first term on the right-hand side is the expected value at time t of future lifetime
utility  conditional  on the individual  having a birth in the current period and no shocks to
their preferences  for more infants.  The second term on the right-hand  side is the expected
value at t of future lifetime utility conditional  on there being no current births and no
preference  shocks.  The third term measures  the expected  value  of the change  in utility  due
to any change  in the individual's  preferences  for more cbhldren.  The optimal decision  rule
for births is therefore:
=iiffJt>O
Optimal  births n*, then, depend on the value of the function  Jt, which  in turn depends on
the parameters  of future lifetime  utility  LUt, the parameters  of the conditional  distribution
function that the  individual uses to  get  the  conditional expectation Et,  the  survival
probability  Pt and the preference  shock 4t.
If one examnes (4.7) and (4.6) carefully,  it will be observed  that the two equations
look like a classical  probit model for n* (see Maddala, 1983),  except that one does not
have a closed-form  expression  for Et[LUtI  nt=1,4t=0-Et[LUt I nt=O,t=O  in terms of the
36model's parameters. Is this model estimable anyway?  The answer is yes, with a  few
additional  assumptions.
Looking  at (4.6),  Wolpin argues that there will always  be a unique value of 4,  call
this critical  value g*,  for which  the indicator  function  Jt will  be zero. ( Simple  algebra says
this value  is just
(4.8)  (* =  Et[LUtj nt=O,ft=O] -Et[LUtInt=1,t  =O]
Pt
Assume that individuals  know the random shock 4t  at the time of the current period
fertility  decision,  but the analyst  does  not ever observe  ft. The analyst  cannot  then observe
Jt directly,  however  she can still observe nR.  To proceed with the estimation, make the
classical  probit assumption  that f* is a ncrmally distributed random variable. With this
assumption  the probability  that the individual  will have a child  in period t (conditional  on
her existing  stock  of children)  is given  by
Pr[nt=l I Mt_i] =  1 -
where a is the standard error of f* and +(x) is the value at x of the standard normal
cumulative  density  function.  Again following  the classical  probit approach,  the probability
of no birth at t (conditional  on the stock  of children)  is given  by
Pr[nt=°  I Mt-,]I  = f  l
Now classify  time periods into two observable  sets-the  set n, consisting  of those periods
where there is a birth, and flc which are those periods where there is no birth. For an
individual  i, then,  the likelihood  Li of any particular  birth pattern is
Li =l  Pr[nt=1  I  MtiI  *  HIterc  Pr[nt=o  I  Mtij
where we have dropped the subscripts  i on 0, 0c, nt, and Mt  to conserve  on notation.
(Note that Li, in general, is ultimately a function of the individual's  basic parameters
37(a1,ot2,flP,# 2,y,b,c,6,cr)  through its  dependence on  Pt )  For  a  sample of  i  =
individuals,  the likelihood  function  is
L = nl  L. i=1 
(which  again  depends  on parameters  through  its dependence  on
The procedure that Wolpin employs  is to search numerically  for the parameter
values  (a1,a2At,#2,-y,b,c,6,a)  that give  the unique value  of (t  that maximizes  L (or its log.)
This sounds  straightforward,  but the computational  burden here is that at every step of the
search one is perturbing the parameters to their new values to get a new value of (*; in
order to go, however,  from any given  value of the parameters (ac 1,a2,#,P2,7,b,c,6,u)  to the
unique (*t  one has to calculate,  by (4.8),  the expression
Et(LUtj nt=l,et=O] - Et[LUtI nt=O,Ct=O]
given the new  parameter values  and the sample data. As intimated above, this expression
does not have a simple  closed-form  solution.  In fact, to get this difference  one actually  has
to solve the dynamic programming  problem (4.1)H4.5) for the maximal value of LUt
backwards  from the ending period T all the way  to period 0. So that at every step of the
way  to the likelihood  masimizing  parameter values  one must numerically  solve a T-period
dynamic program. The computational  complexity  of  the Wolpin procedure is directly
related to how many steps one has to take to find the maximum  of L and the complexity  of
the dynamic  program  that has to be solved  at every  step. Even for simple  specifications  of
his model, this seems to require substantial computing time, to think nothing of the
demands  on the analyst's  programming  time and diagnostic  skdllal
In all fairness, while the complexity  of the procedure may discourage the wider
adoption of his model, Wolpin claims that in order  to replicate all the possible birth
patterns that his model can generate, the use of an alternative astructural econometric
model would  require the estimation  of around 400 parameters, instead of the 13 that he
estimates in his study. While we have no reason to doubt this claim, a more reasonable
approach one could take would be to rule out in the theory some of less likely birth
patterns that could appear in the data. After all, the Wolpin model does not have to
explain  every conceivable  pattern of births  to be usefully  applied  to most datasets.
We close this section by enumerating his empirical findings  on the sensitivity  of
fertility  to changes  in various  exogenous  determinants:
384.4. Evaluation.
To fully  appreciate  the significance  of Wolpin's  model,  one need only  remember that
prior to his 1984 paper, economists did not have a theory of fertility whose dynamic
relations were demonstrably  estimable. Wolpin's model represents the first successful
attempt to estimate the structural parameters of a fully-articulated  theoretical dynamic
programming  problem. This represents a not insignificant  breakthrough  for the dynamic
fertility  choice  research program  in economics.  The tight connection  with the underlying
theory  allows,  potentially,  the analyst  to conduct  policy  analysis  that would be unavailable
if one used an astructural model. For instance,  a direct comparison  of the welfare effects
of certain policies  are possible,  since we possess  estimates of underlying  utility function
parameters and the subjective  discount  rate. For ease of use and analysis,  dosed-form
solutions  for the structural relations are generally  desirable, but are not always  available.
Unfortunately,  for the original Wolpin  model dosed-form solutions  are unavailable,  and
the complexity  of the estimation  procedure goes up substantially,  increasing  the costs of
using  the model.  Our opinion is that it is this drawback  which  has kept the Wolpin  model
from gaining wider acceptance, and not so much for  reasons having to do with the
soundness  of the basic approach.
The empirical  relevance  of the Wolpin  model is evident in the econometric  study  in
his 1984 paper. The predicted values for survival  probabilities and conditional  survival
probabilities  coming  out of the model indicate that the relatively  simple  structure of the
dynamic  programming  model (4.1)-(4.5) is capable of replicating some fairly complex
properties  of the data. The parameter estimates  for the period utility  function  and the cost
functions  appear to be quite reasonable,  and several specification  tests indicate that the
model does  explain  much more than just by pure chance.
5. Newman.
The dynamic  theory of Wolpin models individuals  as having perfect control over
their fertility in any period. This approach is useful for modelling  what influences  an
individual's  time-pattern of demand  for births, but abstracts from any of the interesting
supply-side  influences  such  as biology  or contraceptive  behavior.
There  is  an  earlier  tradition of  dynamic modelling which emphasizes these
supply-side  influences (Heckman and Willis (1975) and Hotz and Miller (1986)) by
positing  that individuals  have indirect control over the number of births in a period, but
39that such  control  is imperfect,  subject  to random influences,  biological  and otherwise.1 2 In
this section  we eiamine the model of Newman (1988). It is a recent treatment in this
tradition,  but is unique in several  important  respects and worthy  of detailed study. Unlike
previous  dynamic  models within this tradition or models of the Wolpin type, Newman's
model delivers  dosed-form solutions  for the fertility problem. As we have seen in the
discussion  of the empirical Wolpin model,  this feature could be potentially  advantageous
from an application  standpoint. Secondly,  unlike previous models of imperfect control.
Newman's  model allows for a continuous  rather than discrete choice of contraceptive
effectiveness,  hence is potentially better able to characterize contraceptive  efficiency,  as
this  is  typically a  continuous variable.  Lastly, Newman's  model  does  introduce
contraceptive  costs  explicitly,  which  is valuable  in that most policy  analysis  regards costs  as
an important  determinant  of fertility  supply;  thus far, however,  existing  research has relied
on static  models  to provide  insight  into the effects  of contraceptive  costs on fertility.
5.1.  Modg.
Unlike  most other models of fertility choice,  Newman's  model is cast in continuous
time. By  itself  this should  not make too much difference  in terms of the basic  results. The
advantage  of a continous  time model is that certain birth and death processes  are easier to
analyze  in continuous  time.
Let period utility  be represented by the function  U(Ct,Mt,ut)  where Ct and Mt are
consumption  and family size, as before, and now the term ut measures contraceptive
efficiency.  A period is now taken to be an arbitrarily  small  instant  of time. Let period 0 be
the onset  of fertility  and let T now represent the end of the fertile cycle.  Let NT represent
the stock  of consumption  from period T onwards  and let p be the instantaneous  discount
rate. Newman  now models  the individual  as choosing  a sequence  of consumptions  Ct, and
contraception  levels  ut as to maximize  the expected  lifetime  welfare  function
(5.1)  EoJ  e PtU(Ct,Mt,ut)  dt + S(CT,NT,T)
where S is the terninal value  fiunction  representing  post-childbearing  utility.
Choice  is subject  to a budget constraint:
(5.2)  Ct + bMt + rut = It
40where r is the cost per unit of increasing  contraceptive  efficiency;  and subjct  to the
stochastic  process  describing  births:
(5.3)  AMt = Ant + Adt-
Ant is a Poisson process for births with parameter (h - ut), i.e.,
The probabilitk-  of a birth  in the interval  At
= Pt(nt+At  - nt=  1)
= (h - ut)At + o(At)
where o(At) represent terms  which  are smaller than At, so that o(At)/At  --  0 as At - 0.
In addition,  Adt is a simple  death process,  i.e.,
The probability  of a death in the interval At
- Pr(nt+At  nt  1)
= MtaAt + o(At)
The probability  of more than one event  occuring  is taken to be
o(At)
and the probability  of no change  is
1 - [(h-ut)  + Mts]At + o(At).
Finally  it is assumed that MO  =  0 and that 0 < ut <  h. The parameter h represents the
madimum  level of fecundity,  and that for biological  or sociological  reasons, the highest
level of ut will  always  fall short of eliminating  all fecundity.
5.2.. Discussion.
The important  features  of the Newman  model  are:
i.  Individuals  employ  contraception  to regulate their fertility  levels.
41ii.  Contraceptive  effectiveness  is not perfect, hence the occurence of a birth nt
remains a stochastic  process,  potentially  (but not modelled as) influenced by
biological  and socio-cultural  factors.
iii.  The only sources of uncertainty  are the birth and death processes. The birth
process,  notably,  is Poisson,  which  is a better description of the waiting-time
characteristic  of the birth  process  than the typical  independent  normal.
iv.  Survival  probabilities  continue  to be emgenous.  Individuals  still do not control
the death process  through  maternal/child health inputs.
v.  Important biological and  socioeconomic  determinants of  fertility can  be
accommodated into  the  model by appropriate modification of  the  birth
process.
vi.  There are explicit  and implicit  psychic  costs associated  with fertility  regulation,
and explicit  costs in each period to increasing  family  size. These costs per unit
are treated as steady  over time.
vii.  Maintenance  costs apply  to the entire stock  of children  Mt.
viii. There is no capital  or wealth  accumulation.
ix  The model is set up in continuous  time.
5.3. Slution.
Solving  the above dynamic  optimization  problem is essentially  an application  of the
BeUman  optimality  principle. Consideration  of aU the details of the procedure is beyond
the scope  of this paper, however  we can outline the basic approach  and go to the bottom
line. Define  the value  function at period  t to be
(5A)  Jt(Ct)Mt)  = max EtJ  e1PtU(Ct,Mt,ut)  dt + S(CT,NT,T)
42subject  to the constraints  of the problem.
The Bellman  principle  of optimality  says that the dynamic  program of period T can
be split up into a backwards recursive sequence of smaller dynamic programs of T-1,
T-2,...,1  periods.  Solving  the T-period program  is equivalent  to solving  the sequence  of T
smaller dynamic  programs.  This principle  allows  us to cascade  the maximization  operator
as to rewrite (5.4)  as (ignoring  the dependence  of J on Ct to conserve  notation)
Jt(Mt)  =  max Et[ J  ePtU(Ct,Mt,ut) dt
+ max  Et  e PtU(Ct,Mt,ut)  dt + S(CTNT,T)1
u t+A  t +At
N  max Et{ ePtU(Ct,Mt,Ut)At
+ max  Et  e PtU(Ct,Mt,ut)  dt + S(CTINT,T)j
u t+At  +At
Since  the second  term on the right-hand  side is Jt+At(Mt+At) we get
(5.4') Jt(Mt)  = max {Et e-Ptt7(Ct,Mt,Ut)dt  + Jt+,t(Mt+,t)}
N maxe  etU(Ct,MtUt)at  + EtJt+,&t(Mt+/&t))
Ut
This is Bellman's  equation for the problem.  In principle,  this is all that is needed (together
with the constraints  and the initial condition M0 =  0) to solve the dynamic problem
nume*calUy  up to  an arbitrarily small approximation error.  However, Newman seeks an
exact closed-form  solution  for contraceptive  use ut. So more work is needed.
If we  subtract  Jt from both sides,  divide  by At, and let At go to zero, we get
max  etU(Ct,Mtut)t  + max  lim  E  t+At(Mt+At  )-Tt(Mt)
ut  At
43After some more work on the second term on the right-hand-side of the above equation,
Newman  shows  that the stochastic  assumptions  about the bir+h  and death processes  imply
that this equation  is equivalent  to
(5.5)  -dJt/dt  =max  ePtU(Ct,Mt,ut)At
Ut
+ max{  (h-ut)[Jt(Mt+l%)-Jt(Mt)I  + AMtfJt(Mt1  )-Jt(M  t)1
Ut
Using a  quadratic specification  for U Newman carries out the maximizations  in  (5.5)
subject  to the budget  constraint  (5.2) and interiority,  0 < ut < h, to get
(5.6) ul  =  ('/2)(r 2+'y)f 1[2r(It-.Ct)-r(  P+0Mt)-J - (1/ 2)(r2+7)vyePt[Jt(Mt+1)-Jt(Mt)]
where %,  6, 0, and  '  are utility function  parameters. This is the equation for the optimal
contraception  rule, it is not quite a cdosed-form  solution yet, as the unsolved  function it
still appears in the expression for u*. Newman employs the method of undetermined
coefficients, along  with  some  subtle  but  intuitive  reasoning,  and  finds  that
Jt(Mt+l)Jt(Mt)  equals
[a+,8(NT)]e( 4C3Dl 4 2A)(T-t)  + 2DIMt + (D1+D2)
where a and # are assumed parameters  associated  with the terminal  value function S, Di
and D2 are constants  to be determined,  and
C2 =  -r(r 2+7)'(b  +  1/20)
C3 = 4(r2+7)- 1.
How one determines the exact value of the constants D1 and D2 is discussed in the
original  source (Newman,  1989.)  Suffice  it to say that an identity between  the coefficients
of the terminal value function S and the value function at the terminal period T, JT'
together with the initial condition  MO  = 0 will  deliver sufficient  restrictions to determine
these constants.  The bottom  line is that the optimal  contraception  rule ut is a closed-form
44function  of the model parameters,  real income, consumption,  contraception  costs, and the
stock  of existing  children  Mt. The exact  specification  is given by (5.6).
To solve for the exact form of the  function J, one can replace ut in  Bellman's
equation (5.4') with u*t and work backwards  from t=T-1  to 0, or  use the  method of
undetermined  coefficients  described  in Newman  (1989).
The  most important (ceteru parnbus)  predictions of  Newman's model  are  the
following:
i.  Optimal contraceptive  efficiency  levels decrease over time as time elapsed
without  a birth increases.  This holds whether the individual  would  like to have
a birth or not. If an individual  wants  to have a birth then ut should  fail as time
periods elapse and no birth occurs. On the other hand, suppose an individual
does not want a birth but is at risk for a  birth, with each period elapsed
without  a birth, the individual  does not need to factor in the exposure to risk
of the period gone by, so u* is still decreasing  with t, given Mt is constant.
Moreover,  Newman  shows  that the rate of decrease of u* is increasing.
ii.  Optimal contraceptive  efficiency  levels may or may not be increasing  with the
stock  of children Mt. It is more likely that u* is positively  related to Mt if the
environment is one where conteption  costs (r) are small, the discount rate p
is small, the  risk of mortality (ja) is small, and the cost of maintaining a larger
stock of children (q) is high. Thwu  contraceptive  control  iS more likely  to be a
positive  fiunction  of the stock of children  in developed  countrnes  and i  likely  a
nceatie function  of the stock  of children  in developing  areas.
iii.  The spacing  of children is determined by the value of fecundability  h - ut at
vaious  points in the individual's  lifetime. If u* is a positive  function of Mt
then individuals  with more children wil have longer birth intervals due to the
use of more effective  contaeptive  regimes.
iv.  The model can generate a  variety of  spacing patterns, including (but not
ezclusively)  a pattern of births consistent with increasing  birth intervas  with
parity.
v.  Increases  in child  mortality  rates cause individuals  to contracept  less.
45vi.  There  are,  potentially, threshold  effects  that  govern  the  behavior
contraceptive  choice  in response  to changes  in the cost of maintaining  children
and real incomes.
vii.  Increases in the value of children at the end of the fertile period will generally
cause individuals  to reduce the efficiency  of contraception.
viii. Increases  in the maximum  level of fecundity  h increase  fecundability  h-ut, even
if one accounts  for optimal behavior ut. This result, put another way, predicts
that more fecund women wiU  tend to have more births, and, because of the
response of spacing to the realization of a birth, will tend to have children
earlier in her fertile period.
5.4.  Estimakon.
The Newman  model, in a sense, rationalizes  the earlier empirical  work on fertility
that employs  hazard-rate modelling  (Heckman  and Willis,  1975;  Newman  and McCulloch,
1984.)  The objective of this type of approach is to estimate the parameters of a fertUity
equation called a hazrd  fiunction,  which captures the probability  of a birth in a period,
given a certain length of waiting  time, exDgenous  determinants  of fertility,  and individual
attempts to regulate the probability  of a birth. The basic strategy  itself is to specify  a
likelihood function for  births. This likelihood function will involve the  birth  hazard
function  h as a function of explanatory  variables  and model parameters.  One then obtains
consistent  parameter estimates by finding those values of the parameters of  h which
maximize  the likelihood function  given  sample  data for the explanatory  variables.
Use of this approach  in conjunction  with Newman's  model presents  some additional
nontrivial  estimation  problems,  however.  The theoretical Newman  model predicts  a more
complicated  specification  of the hazard function than that which  previous  hazard analysis
employs.  For example  in the earlier empirical  work of Newman  and McCulloch  (1984)  the
hazard  function  h. meauring the probability  of the  aLk  birth was  assumed  to be
3
hj=1  =  ePlXt+allt+al 2 g(t-48)+Q 13 g(t-144)
=0  iff  t  <  7
hji1
= eO2Xt+a21  (t-6)+(X 22g(t-18)+a23g(t3O) iff t > 7
46where X  is a vector  of explanatory  variables  (in their empirical  work these were personal
characteristics  and regional variables) and the function  g is defined by g(t-i)  = t - i if
t - i > 0 and zero otherwise. The hazard function of  the theoretical Newman model,
though,  is h - u*; this expression  is even more complicated  because of the complexity  of
the added function  u* capturing  individual  attempts to optimize the hazard of birth. In
addition,  there may appear in the hazard  function  unobserved  heterogeneity  in both tastes
and fecundity  across  individuals.  These  will,  unfortunately,  be correlated  with the choice  of
the control, hence complicating  the process of estimating  the coefficients  of the hazard
function consistently.  Offsetting  these difficulties  is the benefit of having a closed-form
expression  for the optimal control  u*t  and the value  function  Jt. Thus far, these estimation
issues have  yet to  be  worked out  thoroughly but  for  a  recent  treatment of  the
heterogeneity  issue in a hazard analysis  context see Heckman and Walker (1990). The
parameters  of the theoretical Newman  model above,  however,  have yet to be estimated.
5.5. Evaluation.
As an alternative approach to the analysis of  fertility behavior over time, the
Newman  model  presents the analyst  with  several  attractive features.  It directly  addresses  a
central policy  issue, which is how contraceptive  use and costs affect fertility dynamically.
From a theoretical  standpoint  it is better designed  to accommodate  influences  on fertility
emanating from biological sources, as  well as from fertility regulation behavior. The
Newman model can generate a variety of birth spacing and timing patterns, including
threshold effects.  Some of these predicted  relationships  appear to reflect stylized  patterns
in the data. Both the stochastic  process governing  births and fertility regulation behavior
are modelled  to depend on (among  other things)  the time elapsed since the previous  birth.
This last feature is in accord with past approaches  to the analysis  of birth processes.  In
particular, the Newman model fits very handily with work based on empirical hazard
functions,  and hu the added benefit of an available  companion  econometric  methodology.
The Newman model is not, we believe, especially  restrictive in its formulation.
Perhaps  the only  potential limitation  is that the continuous-time  framework  may preclude
consideration  of other useful discrete-time  processes,  or if not this, may create issues of
time-aggregation  in certain empirical contexts.  These difficulties,  however,  have not yet
manifested  themselves  in practical  applications  of hazard-rate analysis  and may well be
only marginally  important.
476. Barro and Becker.
The last prototypical  model we review is the model of Barro and Becker (1988,
1989)  (abbreviated  as BB hereafter) which,  unlike all of the previous models considered,
was designed primarily to look at the behavior  of aggregate  fertilty, in relation to other
variabks of primarily  macroeconomic  interest.  The motivation  for this model is partly the
resurgent interest in models of economic  growth  in which  some of the sources of growth
are  the  consequence of  endogenously made  economic decisions. To  illustrate  the
macroeconomist's  perspective on fertility, consider the well-known Solow-Swan  growth
model. That model holds that madnmizing  steady-state per-capita consumption  in each
period requires  obedieuce  of per-capita capital  kt to the 'tolden rule"'
f'(kt) = At + It
where fl(kt) is the marginal productivity  of the last unit of installed effective  capital, At  is
the rate of depreciation  of capital in the period, and At is the growth rate of the labor
force. As a second  example, consider  the Cass-Koopmans  growth model with discounting
and variable savings  rates. There lifetime  utility  is maximized  when
f'(kt) = At + 6t + ,(1+At)
where # is the discount  factor. In both cases At  figures prominently  in the macroeconomic
optimality  condition  for capital  accumulation.
Since the growth rate of the labor force is directly  connected  to the growth rate of
the population  in question, macroeconomists  are extremely  interested in estimates and
determinants of population growth. In  the older tradition of macroeconomic  growth
models, At was often treated as exogenous  to the growth process. Since the ability to
control fertlity has  become more relevant in  recent decades, At has  become more
influenced  by conscious  economic  choice. Especially  salient, then, to the current research
program of macroeconomics  is the issue of whether endogenous  fertility decisions  are a
potential source  of sustained  growth. A second  important related question  is that of how
fertility decisions  are related with the decision  to invest in children's  human capital and
quality.
The issue of the relationship  between  investment  in children  and the demand for, or
realized number  of children,  is a fairly  traditional.  The pioneering  work in this area relied
on static models  of fertility vs. consumption  choice emphasized in Becker (1960) and
48Becker and  Lewis (1973). Back then,  however, many interesting questions of  the
quantity-quality tradeoff  awaited  the  application of  dynamic  techniques  to  the
microeconomic  choice problem. Moreover,  the task of integrating  the microeconomics  of
household  fertility  and child  investment  decisions  into a macromodel  awaited a time when
the microfoundations  of macroeconomic  models were better understood. This did not
happen  until after the older Keynesian  structural  macromodels  gave way  to representative
agent models  of the new classical  type in which  the introducti,.- of fertility choice into a
complete  structural  model would  be both natural and straightforward.  The culmination  of
efforts to  relate fertility to  the  macroeconomy  is  the  model of  Barro and  Becker
(1988,  1989.)  The contribution of  these authors is a  completely specified model of a
(closed) macroeconomgy  where endogenous  fertility  decisions  are integrated into decisions
on the optimal  time profile  of per-capita consumption  and additions  to the capital  stock.
6.1.  Model.
In the sequel, we follow the development  of the BB model given in their 1989
Egnmomezia paper.  As we  will probe the  technical features of  the  model in  the
subsequent  discussion,  readers interested  in the basic structure and the results  should read
omit the last half of this section  as well as the next section  and go directly  to section  6.3  on
the analytical  results.
Unlike the previous Wolpin  and Newman  models which  look at household fertility
decisions  over the woman's life-cyle,  the BB model is an model of aggregate  lifetime
fertility decisions  over many generations,  it resembles, however, the framework of the
other dynamic  models  of household  fertility  in that a continuing  sequence  of generations
may be  modelled as  behaving like an  infinitelylived  individual. Thus in  the  BB
framework  the objective function that generations (or a  social planner for the  whole
dynasty  of various  generations)  is imagined to solve  continues  to be a discounted  sum of
period utilities which then carries the interpretation of  dynatic rather than individual
lifetime  utility  function.  Let us set up the model.
The economy consists of  identical individual households. Each individual in  a
household lives for  two generations (childhood and  adulthood), indexed by t,  and
thereafter ceases to ezist. Individuals  can, however, beget children at the beginning  of
their  adult stage; these children are  exactly like their  parents in  preferences over
consumption,  and also live two generations. (These assumptions clearly abstract from
considerations  of birth and death probabilities.)  Individuals  are assumed to be altruistic
with respect  to the utility  of their direct progeny.  Formally,  Barro and Becker  assume that
49the utlity Ut of an adult of the tth generation  is given  by
(6.1)  Ut = v(ct) + a(nt)ntUt+1
where v(ct)  is the period utility  component  due to current (own)  consumption  of the single
commodity,  nt is the number of children generated by this individual, and  a(nt) is  a
function  which  captures  the degree of altruism  attached to each of the nt progeny.  In their
model,  BarQo  and Becker  specialize  a to be:
(nt) =  cate  ;  O< a < 1, 0 < f < 1.
The product  a(nt)nt =  ntn-f;  given  the range of f, this implies that Ut is increasing  in the
number of children  nt for fixed Ut+l,  but the marginal increments  to Ut are decreasing.
Recursively  substituting  U,+j in equation (6.1) beginning  from t+j = 1 yields  the dynastic
utility  Jrnction
(6.1')  U  =  0 atNt  v(ct) , where Nt = IIt-1
The variable  Nt is just the number  of descendants  in generation t. To make for convenient
closed-form  solutions,  Barro and Becker  specialize  the function  v to be
v(ct) = c'7;  a < 1.
The second  component  of the BB model is the wealth constraint  of an adult in generation
t. It is assumed  that labor supply  to the market is fixed and normalized  to 1 unit and that
the wage  rate the adult individual  faces is wt. The individual  inherits from her immediate
ancestor a bequest of kt units of (human or nonhuman) capital and can leave similar
bequests to each child of (human or nonhuman) capital kt+1 units. Capital kt earns a
rental rate, rt. Next, let  t  be the per-child cost of raising children of generation t into
adulthood.  The wealth constraint  faing the two-period  lived individual  is then:
(6.2)  wt + (1+rt)kt = ct + nt(pt+kt+i)
The consumption  sub-problem  of the BB model is taken from the point of view of
50the dynastic  head at time 0. She is assumed to choose  for all t > 0 consumption  levels ct,
capital per child kt+i,  and the number of progeny  of each adult in generation t, nt, to
maximize  (6.1') subject to the sequence  of wealth constraints  (6.2) that each subsequent
generation will face and her initial inheritance ko. It is assumed that the dynastic  head
knows  for sure the preferences  and prices that each subsequent  adult of generation t will
face, so that her optimal choices  as dynastic  head at t=0 will continue to be optimal for
decision-makers  in later generations  t=1,2,....  (i.e., the dynastic  head's optimal plans are
'time-consistent.') After some algebra, the maximization  of (6.1) subject to  (6.2) and
kt > 0 yields  the first-order conditions
(6.3a)  [.t  (1-  ant (1+rt+,)
(6.3b)  ct=  I  [Pt_,(1  +rt)-wt]
(6.3c)  k  + Ea=0[1i¶  0(1+rj) ']Ntwt = Et=O[nf 0(1+rj)  ](Ntct+Nt+lpt)
Equation (6.3a) and (6.3b) give the optimal choice  for consumption  growth and fertility.
Looking  at (6.3b) in particular shows  the effect  of higher child-raising  costs on children's
consumption.  As the cost of raising a child in period t-1 flt_l goes up (BB assume that
1-C-- > 0), making  up for this higher cost requires raising the parent's own utility  benefit
from  children.  For fixed  n,, this is done by raising  children's  consumption  levels. Also  from
(6.3b)  we see that consumption  per person can only  grow between  t and t+1 if the cost  of
raising children expressed in period t consumption  goods, i.e., I3t_.(l+rt),  net of their
future income wt, is growing.
To see now what determines  optimal fertlity, substitute  for ct in (6.3a) using  (6.3b)
to get
(6.4)  ntc  = L''+rt+1)/  1  t(l+rt+i)-wt  +1
Fertility  is thus an increasing  function  of altruism  a and the real interest rate rt+i  This  is
because higher altruism or real interest rates make it more economical  to shift away
consumption  into the future by having  more children.  As BB remark:
51(6.13')  (1+ oil(1+g)  W
(6-14')  w + (1+r)E  =  [(j.  1  + n[; +(1+g)kl + bnRI1+r-(1+g)nj
(6.15')  n~  =  fc~(1+r)]  [1](1o)+
where all variables are now taken at their  steady-state values. It  is  this last set  of
equations upon which the interplay between fertility and macroeconomic  variables is
based.  We examine  this in the next section.
6.3. Discussion.
Before discussing  the theoretical results, let us isolate some distinctive  features of
the BB model.
i.  Idividuals are altruistic about their children's consumption.  This altruism is
reflected  in the rate at which  future consumptions  are discounted.
ii.  The BB model assumes perfect fertility control so that realized fertlity is
unilaterally  determined by the generational demand for children. The model
abstracts  from contraceptive  practices,  biological  factors,  and other supply-side
determinants  of family  size in a generation.
ili.  AJ1  births are modelled to take place at the same time (the beginning  of the
adult stage of life.) Hence the model abstracts from issues of birth timing or
spacing.
iv.  In relation to (ii) there is no uncertainty  at all in the model. Individuals  live
for exactly  two periods.  There is no uncertainty  about the occurrence  of a birth
or a death. There are no shocks  to preferences,  or unobservable  heterogeneity
in individual  fecundity.
v.  Wealth and capital accumulation  are integral parts of the model, however,
56intertemporal wealth are essentially bequests to children. Hence the utility
return to adding to children's wealth  is what is equated at the margin to the
value  of parent's sacrifice  of current consumption.
vi.  The model features a competitive  production  sector characterized  by constant
returns  to scale and exDgenous  labor-augmenting  technological  progress  of the
Harrod-neutral type. This assumption  allows for steady-state growth of the
capital  stock  per person  kt at the exogenous  rate g.
vii.  There  is no labor-leisure  tradeoff  in this model.  Leisure time is assumed  fixed.
The tradeoff  is between  the total amount of time devoted  to child-raising  and
the  total amount of  time devoted to  market labor.  The  per-child  time
requirements  for raising children  are fixed at b, however  growth  in wage rates
(the opportunity  cost of nonmarket time) due to productivity  growth leads to
growth  in total child-rearing  costs.
viii.  The BB model is a  closed-economy  model with no migration of labor or
capital,  and no trade or specialization  in production.
The consequences  of the BB assumptions are many, and the authors go into a
detailed discussion  of  the implications  of the steadystate  equations (6.12')-{6.15')  for
macroeconomic  variables. Repeating  and reviewing  all of thes  would  be unduly tedious
so we restrict  attention to those  implications  having  to do with fertlity and fertilityrelated
variables  such as child costs.  Further, in the discusion that follows  relationships  between
variables  are to be understood  as steady-state  relationships.  Therefore  let us focus  initially
on the optimal  steady-state  fertility  equation (6.15a).  In the discussion  that follows.
i.  The number of children  per adult individual  is constant.  Population,  however,
grows  exponentially  once the steady-state is reached; beginning  with a dngle
dynastic  head at t=O,  if the economy  attains the steady-tate  immrediately  the
first generation  will  have n individuals,  the second  n2, etc.
ii.  Fertility  is increasing  with  altruism  and the real interest rate and decreasing  in
the rate of growth  of per capita consumption  (1+g)(1ff). That fertility  should
increase  with altruism  suggests  that more altruistic  individuals  or cultures  will
57The change in  the  relative number of people across generations is  a  form of
intertemporal substitution that  replaces  the  usual  response in  the  path  of
consumption  per person. (Barro and Becker,  1989,  p.485.)
Moreover,  the inverse of the term in parenthesis  in (6.4) is the growth  of the net costs of
children.  Thus fertility  in the BB model is also a (negative)  function  of the growth of net
costs of children.
Equation (6.3c) on the other hand is a dynastic  budget constraint which essentially
says that the present value of income flows equals the present value of all expenditures.
While this equation sheds some light on the intergenerational  discount rate we do not
discuss  this here.
To  complete the model of a  macroeconomy  BB now superimpose a  production
sector on (6.1)-(6.2).  Assume  now that there is a single  firm whose  role is to produce the
consumption  commodity  in each period according  to an aggregate  production  function of
the form:
(6.5)  yt  =  F(Kt,(1+g) tLt)
where Yt is aggregate output; F is a  constant returns to scale function, i.e., AFt -
F(AKt,A(1+g)tt) for any A > 0; Kt and Lt are quantities  of capital and labor employed  by
the firm in production, and the  term  (1+g)t  is a measure of exDgenous Harrod-neutral
technical  progress  (one can think of this as measuring  exogenous  growth  in the quality  or
productivity  of labor.)
The chrice of the Harrod-neutral form for technical  growth  was made in order for
the model to have steady-state growth,  in which  all variables  will  be growing  at the rate g.
The constant  returns to scale assumption  allows  one to divide  both sides of the production
function by (1+g)tLt to get outputs and capital inputs measured in units per 'Effective"
worker:
(B)Y  F(Kt I (g)Lt)  =
(l+g),Lt  1  lg)  tL  Lt  (1+g)tLt
52so that, writing  f(it) =  F(t,j),  the production  function  for "effective"  output is
(6.5')  it  f(Ft)
it  and it  now carry the interpretation of output per effective worker and capital per
effective  worker.  Suppose  that the firm takes as given  the wage  rate wt and the rental rate
of capital  rt. Standard  profit-maximizing  conditions  are known  to be
(6.7)  rt = fP(it)  ;  Wt  = [f(Ft)-f'(Ft)FtI(l+g) t
These conditions,  together with  the wealth  constraint (6.2),  will  be used later to determine
the evolution  of capital  k,. For definitional  purposes  it will  later be useful to work with the
wage  rate per effective  worker  defined  as
-w
(6.8)  Wt  t  =  [f(t)-f(t)FtJ
(1+g)tLt
To dose the BB model requires us to describe how labor Lt gets to be supplied  to
the firm. Assume, as  did Barro and  Becker, that  some fixed amount b  of  the time
endowment  of adult individuals  must be used towards  child rearing in addition to other
non-time (commodity)  inputs. If wt is the wage  rate the total time cost of raising a child
will be bwt.  In this economy  the wage rate wt (not Wt)  will be growing  over time at the
rate g by equation (6.7).  For non-time (commodity)  costs of child-raising  not to become
insignificant  as the economy  grows,  the commodity  costs of child-rearing  should  also grow
at rate g. So  let a be the fied  quantity  of the single  commodity  applied towards  the raising
of a child.  The total cost  of raising  a child  which  was  labelled  fit, may  then be written as
(6.9)  Pt = a(l+g)t  + bwt
and, again,  for later convenience  we may  define the "effective  cost"  of raising a child to be
53(6.10)  14  _  gt  = a + b[f(ft)-f'(Ft)ftJ-
(1+g)tLt
Since the time endowment of the adult individual  is normalized to 1, the labor supply
available  for production  equals 1-bnt times the number of people alive at t:
(6.11)  Lt =  (1-bnt)Nt
We will be rewrting, very shortly, variables  appearing in the wealth constraint and the
optimality  conditions  in terms of effective  labor units. This last equation implies that the
variable kt which is measured in terms of capital per (adult) person will need to be
divided by (1-bnt)(1+g)t to get its counterpart Ft measured in terms of effective  (adult)
laborers.
62. Solution'13
Let  us now provide the  solution of  the  model. First  express the variables of
remaining  optimality  conditions  in terms of effective  workers.  The wealth constraint may
be rewritten  using  (l-bnt)ft  = (1+g)At  and Et = (1+g)Y&c:
(6.12)  t + (1-bnt)(l+rt)ft  = Et  + nt[Pt+(I+g)(1-bnt+,)ft+,]
Rewriting  (6.3b)  in similar  fashion gives
(6.13)  ct=  [-][  t-1  (1+rt)
These last two equations in turn imply  an expression  that governs  the evolution  of capital
per effective  worker Et.  As it turns out, fertility  nt matters for capital  accumulation:
(6.14) wt + (lbnt)(l+rt)it  =  [l ] [-  (l+r)  - wt]  + nt[Pt+(1+g'(1-bnt+i)ft+ll
54To see why  this equation determines  the evolution  of kt, note that it implicitly  gives  k-t+1
as a  function  of it  and variables dated t  and earlier, except for the  variable it+r
However,  from (6.4) we find that nt is a function  of the price variables  wt,rt,  and Zt
(6.15)  nt =  [a(l+r t)]  -(I+rt)-(  +g)  t  (1-of)
Since wt,rt, and Bt are in turn functions  of Ft only (see equations (6.7),(6.8),  and (6.10)
above) updating  (6.15) and substitution  into equation (6.14) makes (6.14) a function  of
Ft]Xt+1 and parameters only. The  procedure for  studying capital accumulation is
straightforward:  given that n0=1, and a starting value for ko, we use this starting value in
(6.7),(6.8),  and (6.10) to find r1,wl, and /1.  From this we can calculate by (6.15) the
optimal number of  descendants n1. We  then  obtain k1 from (6.14). Iterating this
procedure  for t>1 gives  kt+1 for t>1.
Rather than study all the possible  paths along which kt,ntFt, and it evolve, Barro
and Becker  focus  only on the steady-state  grouwth  path. This the path along which capital
per effective  worker  is constant,  that is, ft+,  = E. This path is usually  interpreted as the
path that the economy  will  converge  to in the long-run. As Barro and Becker prove,  this
steady-state  exists  and is unique if the parameter b is not 'too large."  For details on these
results,  see the original  source.
Since Et is constant along this path, so will rt,Wt,Bt  be constant. From this and
equations  (6.3b),(6.5'),  and (6.15)  above it follows  that yt,ct,and  also nt will not grow  over
time. However  if Ft is steady, this does not mean that kt is also steady, since kt is capital
per person,  not per effective  worker. While F  tis fixed, kt will be growing  each period by
the factor (1+g). By the same token, while Wjt,  and it  are steady, their counterparts
measured  in per-person terms, wt,ct,  and Yt,  are growing  at the rate g in the steady-state.
Taking this into account, assuming that  the  BB  economy has  reached a  long-run
steady-state  growth  path, (6.12)-6.15) simplify  to
(6.12')  w + (1+r)k = E  + n(j + (1+g)1I + bnE[1+r-(1+g)nJ
55eventually  have larger steady-tate  populations,  reflecting a kind of 'hatural
selection"  process. That fertility should increase with the real interest rate
makes sense in the model, since increasing  the relative value of consumption
in later periods is essentially  increasing  the value of children alive in later
periods.  That it should decrease as consumption  per capita grows faster is a
consequence  of the discount  rate for future consumption  depending  positively
on  the number of  children in  those future periods. Observe that  in  the
steady-state the utility discount  rate between two adjacent periods is an 1-c
Unlike standard macroeconomic  growth models, the  discount rate  in  BB
depends  on the endogenowly  determined fertility  level. In order to encourage
higher levels of future consumption  (hence, higher consumption  growth) one
has to lower the discount rate of future consumption.  This can be done by
having  more children.
Also worth  considering  is the effect of an increase in effective  child-rearing costs  p
on fertility.  Normally  it is expected  that higher  i  would  tend to lower fertility  levels.  In the
BB model,  however,
iii.  Increases in child-rearing costs have no direct effet  on steady-state fertility
levels n. (Child-rearing costs ,  do not appear at all in equation (6.15').) Any
effect of ,  on n is indirect, working  through changes  in the steady-state levels
of lit and r. We have argued above that in the  BB model higher A only
motivates  individuals  to endow  children with more consumption  ct, and this is
also true for the steady state Z. To raise steadystate  Z, however, requires one
to either increase j, which is possible only by raising E. However raising E
reduces steady-state real interest rates r  because, by (6.7), r  =  f'(i).  The
reduction  in r makes  n decline,  by result (ii) above.
The empirical content of (iii) is as follows:  if the model is true, then policy or
exgenous  shocks that bring up the costs of raising children should have the effect of
raising both real interest  rates  and fertility. However, if  one were to  eliminate that
component  of fertiity which  is explained  by changes  in real  interest  rates, the residual  should
be orthogonal  to the policy or exogenous  shock.  Examples  of policies  that would have this
58effect  are  direct  taxes on  children, higher  social  security taxes,  eliminations of
child-maintenance  related subsidies  and exemptions,  legislated increases in wage rates.
Examples  of other shocks would be structural shifts in female labor force participation
rates, experience-related  changes in wage rates, or even heterogeneity across families
within  the economy  or across  economies.
Other results  of interest are:
iv.  Whereas  in (ii) it was remarked that higher  g tends to have the direct effect  of
reducing  fertility n, There may be an indirect effect of g that works in the
opposite  direction, operating through  increases in  r.  As  long  as  the
steady-state  is stable, BB show  that higher  per capita growth  g tends to reduce
i  and  hence raise  r.  Therefore the overall effect of  g  on  fertility n  is
ambiguous.
V.  Higher taxes on capital may or may not result in higher n. This is because
higher taxes on capital tend to reduce i, however  individuals  may reduce E  by
either increasing n, or decreasing  n  but decreasing Kt at a faster rate than
the resulting  reduction  in Lt.
Finally,  we should mention for completeness  that fertility decisions  do provide an
endogenous  source  of growth  of total  output  in the model. In the steadystate, output per
effective  worker  is steady, but output per 'brdinary"  worker grows  at the rate g. However
the pool of ordinary  workers  grows  at the same rate as the population,  which  is increasing
by the factor n with each generation.  Therefore total output itself should  be growing  by a
factor of (l+g)n each period.
6A. Econometric  Implementation.
The BB model provides a host of testable relationships  between fertility, capital
accumulation,  child-rearing  costs,  real interest rates, and exogenous  sources  of growth.  To
our knowledge  both the model itself and its implications  have yet to be econometrically
examined.  At this point we wish only to make three general comments  on developing  an
estimation  strategy  for the model.
First, the original BB model is nonstochastic;  in order then to estimate the model
structurally  the analyst  has to make assumptions  about the type and form of the stochastic
59influences that are believed to impinge upon the model. Naturally, the  way in  which
stochastic shocks  are specified  matters for the identification  and robustness of the model
parameters,  as well as the appropriate  econometric  technique  to employ.
Next,  we remark that while the BB model may be applied to both time-series data
and cross-sectional  data, there are issues of aggregation  and the size of the resulting
dataset. With time-series data, the main question is how long a time period is necessary
for generational  effects to be manifest.  Barro and Becker (1988)  seem to indicate that a
period is typically  long, probably around thirty to forty years. Once the period length is
determined one  has  to then  aggregate up the  data. This time-series approach thus
requires a very  extensive  set of historical  data to implement,  as the sampling  frequency  of
the data may be as much as thirty or so years. For purely cross-sectional  datsets the BB
model may not  be  appropriate for  purely crosssectional  data  sets  if  the  level of
aggregation of  the  individual data  is  at  an  open-economy level, rather  than  a
closed-economy  one. (For example, analyzing  U.S. data at the state level may require
modification  of the BB model to account  for effects  of interstate capital flows and labor
migration on  capital accumulation and  child production.) Cross-sectional data  over
several generations  is probably  the best one can realistically  hope for, but even this is not
entirely  free of limitations.  As mentioned in Barro and Becker (1989)  aggregation across
individuals may smooth out  some of  the  steady-state convergence patterns  at  the
houehold  level, making it  difficult, if  not  impossible to  analyze these generational
pdtterns.
Lastly,  we should mention that not all empirical work in macroeconomic  growth
models has  relied on  structuralist econometric approaches. The  analyst may prefer
astructural econometric methods  such as  vector autoregressions, coiategration  methods,
and related time-series frameworks  to understand  the generational  patterns of fertility u
long as the data permits.  Alternatively,  the analyst  might employ  simulation  or calibratioh
methods to determine how well a parameterized version of the model fits the data. See
Smith and Gregory (1990)  for a discussion  of these methods as they have been used in
macroeconomics.  Like traditional  econometric  approaches,  these strategies would require
explicit  specification  of the stochastic  elements of the  model.
6.5.  Evaluation.
The Barro and Becker model integrates fertity  choices into a  macroeconomic
model of growth. This synthesis  is a particularly  useful framework for the analysis of
aggregate movements  in fertility across closed economies over long spans of time. It is
60especially  relevant  for addressing  questions  about how  fertility  affects  long-run growth  and
capital accumulation.  As a model of the determinants  of fertility it emphasizes  economic
factors acting mainly through the demand for fertility, specifically,  things like the real
interest rate, the degree of altruism,  and the costs of child-rearing.  It is thereful much less
useful for the analysis  of other determinants  of fertility  that act upon the supply  of births,
in particular, contraceptive  use, individual  fecundity,  health inputs, and biology. On the
face of it, it would seem that some  of these other determinants  can be introduced  into the
BB model without upsetting their basic results on capital accumulation  and the other
variables  tied to capital accumulation.  The level at which fertility choices are modelled
abstracts from life-cycle considerations and examines intergenerational choice. In  its
present form it is not yet useful,  then, for the analysis  of birth spacing  and timing patterns
within a  generation. Barro and Becker indicate that the  model can be  extended to
incorporate  life-cycle  decisions,  but not without  creating  substantial  complications.
While the BB model is mainly  useful for understanding  the implications  of fertility
choice  on the time paths of key macroeconomic  variables, it is also of direct interest to
empirical research on  fertility because it  does  provide unique testable propositions
concerning  the effects  of policy  on fertility.  On this point, it is of some  importance to note
that over the long-run the BB model predicts that influences  of policy  on generational
fertility  act only indirectly  through  three channels:  altruism,  consumption  growth, and real
interest rates. This is in stark contrast to most other models of fertility which typically
derive direct structural connections  between policy or costs of children and the demand for
children.
We do not view the BB model as a direct alternative  to the micromodels  of Wolpin
or Newman.  Rather, we view  the BB model as more of an integrating  general equilibrium
framework,  which can be modified  to accomodate  features of micromodels,  if the nature
of the research questions so requires. While much existing research into fertility has
emphasized  the analysis  of microeconomic  life-cycle decisions,  the time may be right to
integrate this knowledge  of the fertility decision with its consequences  for growth and
fluctuations  in the modern macroeconomy.
Cerwl.siem&
The objective of  this paper was to  survey critical approaches to the  economic
modelling  of fertility determinants. We have identified two distinct frameworks: static
choice  models  of lifetime  fertlity levels  and dynamic  models  of birth timing,  birth spacing,
and intergenerational  fertlity levels. Within each framework we have reviewed three
61distinct prototypical  methodologies  for the analysis  of the fertility question. Our belief is
that these six  models and their estimation  technologies  will continue to remain influential
for some  time to come.
This paper has not examined in great specificity  the many ways in which policy
inferences becomes limited  or  biased or  even  erroneous due  to  the  use  of  one
methodological  framework  over another. To provide a rigorous  treatment of these issues
was beyond  the intended scope of this paper, and requires a separate study.  Moreover,  we
did not attempt to survey  in detail or critique empirical  finding. of studies that have used
each model.  However  we have tried to incorporate,  at relevant points, discussions  of how
the models  surveyed  limit the scope of the policy  questions  that one can ask, and how one
might  examine  particular policy  questions  in the context  of these models.
62Notsa.
1See Easterlin's  rebuttal to Schultz  in Easterlin, 1986,  p.3.
2An example  is the Livingston  panel survey,  which polls the expectations  of economists
about the future  levels  of prices  in the economy,  and other variables.
3Two concepts in economics which have similar problems of  interpretation are  the
concepts  of "voluntary  ' and 'involuntary"  unemployment.
4In the reformulation  of Montgomery  (1987)  some of this is lost so that the Montgomerv
model discussed  below  cannot be properly  regarded as a path model.
5An excellent  and detailed reference on the Tobit  estimation  procedure,  together with  the
related probit  and logit procedures  is Maddala  (1983).
6Incidentally,  Easterlin's interpretation  of Malinvaud  in the opening quotation to his 1986
rejoinder is  not quite to  the point either. Malinvaud's  quotation (  'The  methods of
mathematical  statistics  do not provide  us with  a means of specifying  the model.') says that
fishing  in your  pool of data will  not provide  a specification  for the model,  only clues as to
what specifications  are likely to be rejected by that particular data set. It is the job of
theory to provide  specifications  that can be tested against a broad set of real world data.
The theory whose implications secure the widest support becomes the model that is
tentatively  accepted as  'truth," that is the poition  taken in this review. But to say, as
Easterlin suggests, that  'the  choice of  model has  nothing to  do  with the  statistical
methodology,"  (Easterlin, 1986,  pp.13-14.)  could  mean that either (1) a theoretical model
cannot lead one to some particular empirical specifications,  requiring in turn their own
appropriate  statistical  procedures,  or (2) that theorizing  is not conditioned  by empiricism
in one form  or another. Neither of these is true generally,  and neither of these statements
appears  to be what Malinvaud  meant.
7Dependence of utility functions on outside forces that are  not influenced by choice
behavior  is, to a degree, manageable.  In a crude way  this is what one does in resorting to
the use of dummy  variables  in a regression  to capture the dependence  of preferences  on
outside social  or psychological  factors. However,  problems involving  the dependence of
utility  functions  on choice behavior  itself are much  more difficult,  as the classic  problem  of
moral  hazard  illustrates.
8To be fair economists  are really quite silent  on whether all behavior  is in fact a conscious
process or something  else-There  is more general agreement, however,  that whether or
63not  individuals behave  consciously, observed  economic behavior  is  such  that  one  can
proceed  to  model individuals behaving  as  if they made  conscious choices. The  act of
driving a car at some point becomes instinctive behavior, but  one can  model the  driving
behavior of an individual as a solution to a set of equations describing the  velocity and
acceleration of the car, the speed of the person's reflexes, the number of cars on the same
road, his utility or disutility of pain, etc., without really believing that individuals actually
solve such an equation system in their heads before making a decision to apply the brakes
or not to.
As applied to  the  fertility decision, the  economic approach to  modelling suggests
that whatever be the process oi the variables that people use to decide on whether to have
an additional child or not-instinct,  racial memory, medicine men, calculus of variations-
observed behavior is such that we may as well have chosen to describe the choice process
as if people consciously  maximized a utility function.
If anything, from casual observation alone we might form strong priors that fertility
choices are likely to to be remarkably conscious and deliberate in both developed societies
where the economic opportunity costs of fertility is high and in less developed societies
where income flows are  low enough or  highly uncertain  that  children  are  likely to  be
regarded as investments or a form of social security. The contraceptive method  choice is
also  likely to  be  consciously undertaken  with  explicit  and  psychic  costs,  perceived
method-specific failure  rates,  and  long-term  health  effects figuring significantly in  the
selection  process. The  problem  in  less  developed  country  scenarios  is  not  whether
individuals consciously  or  unconsciously  form their decisions about how many children to
have or  what methods  to  use. The problem is whether  the  fact that  information  about
things like natural fecundity or the reliability of contraceptive methods is poor and costly
to gather, and the fact that there is simply more randomness about the future environment
make it useless to  model individuals as maximizing agents. The best  way to  answer this
question is to fit an  economic model and  see if it improves upon  the results  of models
without maximizing  individuals.
9RS  anticipate this  in  a  footnote  (no.  10) and  they had  actually conducted Hausman
specification tests against OLS estimates of (2.3'), but do not report similar test results for
the  two-stage  instrumental-variables  estimates.  Presumably(?)  the  two-stage  model
passed this specification test for in the sequel RS claim that its estimates are consistent. In
a later  study using Malaysian data (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1987) they do report results
of Hausman tests for the second-stage estimates.
10Montgomery recognizes this: '"ow  does the framework described here differ from that
64of Easterlin and Crimmins? Note that the coefficient  a2, reflecting  the psychic  costs of
contraception,  is an element  of the demand-for-births  equation (6) [i.e.,  equation (3.6a) in
the sequel above.]  The greater the disutility  associated  with contraception,  the higher the
derived demand  for births. Easterlin's  hypothetical  concept of demand-the  demand for
births under the condition  that contraception  is costless-could certainly  be represented by
equation (6) with a2 set to zero. That theoretical  representation,  however,  achieves  little
in  the  absence  of  an  empirical  measure  of  notional  or  hypothetical
demands."  (Montgomery,  1987,  p.483.)
11Or  basic determinants, if  one  likes-in  Montgomery's paper  these  are  marriage
duration,  education, region  ethnicity, and  survival probabilities  calculated  from
independent  census  data.
12In the more recent model of Hotz and Miller, a discrete-time dynamic  programming
framework  is developed  which considers the impact on childbearing  of the potential to
participate  in the labor force. Contraception  influences  the conception  probability,  but is
essentially a zero-one choice for the individual. Unlike the Wolpin frame  vork which
generates spacing  of births due to the interplay  of discounting  and the rising time profile
of income,  Hotz and Miller's  framework  generates spacing  due to income changes,  as well
as reductions  in the time cost  of children  as children  age.
13This  section  may be skipped for those interested mainly in the analytical  results. The
main conclusion  of this section  is that there is a unique steady-state for the BB model in
which  F  - rt - E  and nt are constant  (but kt,wt,3t,t, and ct are growing  at the rate g.)
The  steady-state relationships between  these  variables  are  given  by  equations
(6.12')-(6.15').
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